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Pengkomputeran Awan Mudahalih (PAM) adalah gabungan pengkomputeran awan 
dan pengkomputeran mudah alih melalui teknologi tanpa wayar untuk mengatasi 
batasan sumber peranti mudah alih. Dalam PAM, virtualisasi memainkan peranan 
utama manakala sumber awan dikongsi di kalangan ramai pengguna untuk membantu 
mereka mencapai prestasi yang cekap dan mengeksploitasi kapasiti maksimum 
pelayan awan. Walau bagaimanapun, kekurangan aspek keselamatan menghalang 
manfaat teknik virtualisasi, di mana pengguna yang berniat jahat boleh melanggar dan 
merosakkan data sensitif dalam Mesin Maya (MM) yang diedarkan. Oleh itu, kajian 
ini bertujuan untuk memberi perlindungan terhadap MM yang diedarkan dan data 
sensitif pengguna mudah alih dari segi keselamatan dan privasi. Kajian ini 
mencadangkan pendekatan berdasarkan proksi awan yang dikenali sebagai Proxy-3S 
yang menggabungkan tiga dasar keselamatan untuk MM; kawalan akses pengguna, 
peruntukan yang selamat, dan komunikasi yang selamat. Proxy-3S memastikan MM 
diagihkan selamat di pelayan yang berlainan di awan. Ia meningkatkan pemberian 
kebenaran akses untuk tugas-tugas aplikasi yang diagihkan secara intensif. Tambahan 
lagi, algoritma yang membolehkan komunikasi yang selamat di kalangan MM yang 
diedarkan dan perlindungan data sensitif dalam MM di atas awan dicadangkan. 
Prototaip dilaksanakan pada simulator NetworkCloudSim untuk mengurus 
keselamatan MM dan kerahsiaan data secara automatik. Beberapa eksperimen telah 
dijalankan menggunakan aplikasi diedarkan penjagaan kesihatan dunia dari segi 
kecekapan, liputan dan masa pelaksanaan. Eksperimen menunjukkan bahawa 
pendekatan yang dicadangkan mencapai kecekapan dan nisbah liputan penyerang yang 
lebih rendah; sama dengan 0.35 dan 0.41 masing-masing dalam semua konfigurasi 
berskala berbanding dengan kerja yang sedia ada. Di samping itu, masa pelaksanaan 
pendekatan yang dicadangkan adalah memuaskan dari 441ms hingga 467ms 
konfigurasi awan kecil dan besar. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menyediakan integriti 
dan kerahsiaan dalam bertukar maklumat sensitif di kalangan pelbagai pihak 
berkepentingan dalam aplikasi mudah alih yang diedarkan. 
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Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) is a combination of cloud computing and mobile 
computing through wireless technology in order to overcome mobile devices' resource 
limitations. In MCC, virtualization plays a key role whereas the cloud resources are 
shared among many users to help them achieve an efficient performance and exploiting 
the maximum capacity of the cloud’s servers. However, the lack of security aspect 
impedes the benefits of virtualization techniques, whereby malicious users can violate 
and damage sensitive data in distributed Virtual Machines (VMs). Thus, this study 
aims to provide protection of distributed VMs and mobile user’s sensitive data in terms 
of security and privacy. This study proposes an approach based on cloud proxy known 
as Proxy-3S that combines three security policies for VMs; user’s access control, 
secure allocation, and secure communication. The Proxy-3S keeps the distributed VMs 
safe in different servers on the cloud. It enhances the grants access authorization for 
permitted distributed intensive applications’ tasks. Furthermore, an algorithm that 
enables secure communication among distributed VMs and protection of sensitive data 
in VMs on the cloud is proposed. A prototype is implemented on a NetworkCloudSim 
simulator to manage VMs security and data confidentiality automatically. Several 
experiments were conducted using real-world healthcare distributed application in 
terms of efficiency, coverage and execution time. The experiments show that the 
proposed approach achieved lower attacker’s efficiency and coverage ratios; equal to 
0.35 and 0.41 respectively in all experimented configurations compared with existing 
works. In addition, the execution time of the proposed approach is satisfactory ranging 
from 441ms to 467ms of small and large cloud configurations. This study serves to 
provide integrity and confidentiality in exchanging sensitive information among multi-
stakeholder in distributed mobile applications.   
 
 
Keywords: Security policies, Mobile Cloud Computing, Virtualization security, 














Some of the works presented in this thesis have been published or submitted as listed 
below. 
 
[1] Boubakeur Annane, Osman Ghazali, “Virtualization-Based Security Techniques 
on Mobile Cloud Computing: Research Gaps and Challenges” in Proceedings of 
International Conference on Future Internet Systems and Applications (ICFISA). 10 
& 11 Dec 2018, Kuala lumpur. Malaysia. 
 
[2] Boubakeur Annane, Osman Ghazali, and Adel Alti, “A New Secure Proxy-Based 
Distributed Virtual Machines Management In Mobile Cloud Computing “ in 
Proceedings of 7th International Conference On Computing & Informatics (ICOCI). 
28 March 2019, Bangkok, Thailand. 
[3] Boubakeur Annane, Osman Ghazali, “Virtualization-Based Security Techniques 
on Mobile Cloud Computing: Research Gaps and Challenges” published in 
International Journal of Interactive Mobile Technologies (iJIM) ‒ Vol. 13, No. 4, April 
2019. Indexed Scopus: Q3. 
[4] Boubakeur Annane, Osman Ghazali, and Adel Alti, “A New Secure Proxy-Based 
Distributed Virtual Machines Management In Mobile Cloud Computing” published in 
International Journal of Advanced Computer Research (IJACR), Vol 9(43). Indexed 
Scopus: Q4. 
[5] Boubakeur Annane, Osman Ghazali, and Adel Alti, “Proxy-3S: A New Security 
Policies-based Proxy for Efficient Distributed Virtual Machines Management in 
Mobile Cloud” submitted to Journal of Transactions on Emerging 
Telecommunications Technologies (ETT). Clarivate Analytics, Indexed ISI and 
Scopus: Q2. 
[6] Boubakeur Annane, Adel Alti, and Osman Ghazali, “SecNetworkCloudSim: An 
Extensible Simulation Tool for Secure Distributed Mobile Applications” accepted for 
publication in the International Journal of Communication Networks and Information 














In the name of ALLAH, Most Gracious, Most Merciful: 
“Work; so Allah will see your work and (so will) His Messenger and the believers;” 
______________________________________(The Holy Quran - AtTawbah 9:105) 
 
My Deepest thanks and sincere gratitude goes to my supervisors Prof. Madya Dr. 
Osman Ghazali (School of Computing, Universiti Utara Malaysia) and Associate Prof. 
Dr. Adel Alti (Department of Computer Science, University Ferhat Abbas Setif-1, 
Algeria) for their tireless encouragement, wisdom and experience. Prof. Madya Dr. 
Osman Ghazali provided me with constant guidance and constructive criticism 
throughout all stages of my research. I will never forget your patience, input and 
suggestions. I must extend my thanks and gratitude to my co-supervisor Associate 
Prof. Dr. Adel Alti for his guidance and continuous support during my research and in 
all my university studies stages (bachelor, Master, and PhD). His wide knowledge of 
research, logical way of thinking and serious attitude toward research has given me 
great encouragement and inspiration to accomplish this research. He really showed 
and shared with me all his experience, research ideas (practical and theory) and 
motivated me in all my critical times to achieve the completion of my PhD journey. 
Thanks to both my supervisors, it was my pleasure to study and supervised under your 
excellency. Without your valuable support, my thesis would not have been possible. 
 
I would like also to express a huge thank to the current and past members of 
InterNetWorks Research Lab whom I enjoyed working with. Especially my thanks and 
best regards to the Head of InterNetWorks Research Lab Professor Dr. Suhaidi Hassan 
and Dr. Yousef Ali Fazea Alnadesh.   
 
My grateful thanks are also extended to the Dean of Awang Had Salleh Prof. Dr. Ku 
Ruhana Ku Mahamud and Deputy Dean Dr. Nur Haryani Binti Zakaria who support, 
helped me in my study, and reply all my inquiries.  
Additionally, I would like to thank my friends in Setif and Malaysia for their sincere 




Not in the least, many thanks to my beloved Universiti Utara Malaysia for having trust 
in me to complete PhD journey. 
 
Finally, my heartiest gratitude goes to my family, to my dear father Seghir Annane, to 
my dear mother Hayat whom always have faith in me and pray for my success, to my 
brothers Taki Eddine and Idriss, who are willing to extend a helping hand, to my 




























Table of Contents 
Permission to Use ......................................................................................................... ii 
Abstrak ........................................................................................................................ iii 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... iv 
Declaration ................................................................................................................... v 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... vi 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables............................................................................................................. xiii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... xiv 
List of Abbreviations................................................................................................. xvi 
 
CHAPTER ONE     INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1 
1.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research Motivation ...................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Problem statement ......................................................................................... 7 
1.4 Research Questions ..................................................................................... 11 
1.5 Research Objectives .................................................................................... 11 
1.6 Research Scope ............................................................................................ 12 
1.7 Research Contribution ................................................................................. 13 
1.8 Significance of the Study ............................................................................ 14 
1.9 Organization of the Thesis .......................................................................... 15 
 
CHAPTER TWO   LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................... 19 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 19 
2.2 Mobile Cloud Computing ............................................................................ 19 
2.2.1 Mobile Cloud Computing Concept ...................................................... 21 
2.2.2 Cloud Computing Deployment Mode and Pertaining Security ........... 22 
ix 
 
2.2.3 Offloading ............................................................................................ 23 
2.2.4 An Overview of Mobile Cloud Computing Challenges ....................... 24 
2.2.5 Security and Privacy Requirements in MCC ....................................... 26 
2.2.6 Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Cloud Computing ................... 27 
2.2.7 Virtualization Security on MCC .......................................................... 28 
2.3 Concept of Proxy and Utility ....................................................................... 30 
2.4 Virtualized System Attacks Classification .................................................. 31 
2.4.1 Attacks Roots in Virtualized System ................................................... 32 
2.5 Related Security Techniques for Virtualization Challenges ....................... 34 
2.6 Comparative study of related works ............................................................ 44 
2.7 Related Cloud Tools and Comparative Study ............................................. 56 
2.8 Diffie–Hellman and Hash on Encrypted Key Exchange ............................. 66 
2.8.1 Diffie-Hellman Algorithm ................................................................... 66 
2.8.2 Hash algorithms ................................................................................... 68 
2.9 Summary ..................................................................................................... 69 
 
CHAPTER THREE   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................... 70 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 70 
3.2 Research Framework ................................................................................... 71 
3.2.1 Research Phases ................................................................................... 73 
3.2.2 Conceptual Model ................................................................................ 74 
3.2.3 Development of the Proposed Approach ............................................. 77 
3.3 Policies-Based Security Approach .............................................................. 79 
3.4 Performance Evaluation .............................................................................. 83 
3.4.1 Different techniques of performance evaluation .................................. 83 
3.4.2 Evaluation Environment....................................................................... 85 
3.4.3 Performance Metrics ............................................................................ 89 
x 
 
3.5 Summary ..................................................................................................... 91 
 
CHAPTER FOUR   PROXY-3S: A NEW SECURITY POLICIES-BASED 
PROXY   FOR EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTED VIRTUAL MACHINES IN 
MOBILE CLOUD .................................................................................................... 92 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 92 
4.2 Co-Residency Attacks and Performance Measures ..................................... 93 
4.2.1 Co-Residency Attacks .......................................................................... 93 
4.2.2 Normalized Performance Measures ..................................................... 94 
4.3 The Proposed Approach .............................................................................. 98 
4.3.1 General Architecture and Functional Model ........................................ 99 
4.4 Virtual Machines Communication Security in Cloud Computing ............ 104 
4.4.1       Improved Efficiency and Coverage Metrics ...................................... 104 
4.4.2 Problem Definition and Security Modeling ....................................... 108 
4.5 Proxy-based security policies details ........................................................ 111 
4.5.1 Mobile User Access Control and Authentication Algorithm ............. 113 
4.5.2 Secure VM allocation Algorithm for resisting co-residence.............. 116 
4.5.3 Secure VMs Communication Algorithm for resisting remote co-
residence ........................................................................................................... 119 
4.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 121 
 
CHAPTER FIVE   SecNetworkCloudSim: AN EXTENSIBLE SIMULATION 
TOOL FOR SECURE DISTRIBUTED MOBILE APPLICATIONS .............. 122 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 122 
5.2 An Extended Security Simulation Tool ..................................................... 122 
5.2.1 SecNetworkCloudSim: Secure Network Cloud Simulator ................ 123 
5.2.2 Main Functional building modules .................................................... 124 
5.3 Design and implementation of SecNetworkCloudSim.............................. 128 
xi 
 
5.3.1 Modeling of SecNetworkCloudSim ................................................... 128 
5.3.2      Simulation Execution Workflow ........................................................ 134 
5.4 Summary ................................................................................................... 136 
 
CHAPTER SIX   PROXY-3S PERFORMANCE ANALYSES AND 
EVALUATION IN DISTRIBUTED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT ................... 137 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 137 
6.2 Implementation and Validation ................................................................. 137 
6.2.1 Prototype implementation .................................................................. 138 
6.2.2 An Illustrative Case Study: Health Care System ............................... 139 
6.3 Experimental evaluation ............................................................................ 143 
6.3.1 Experimental configurations .............................................................. 143 
6.3.2 Evaluating the efficiency of Proxy-3S ............................................... 144 
6.3.3 Evaluating the coverage of Proxy-3S ................................................. 147 
6.3.4 Efficiency and coverage comparison ................................................. 148 
6.4 Performances and Security Comparison Details ....................................... 157 
6.4.1  Comparison of processing execution time ........................................ 157 
6.4.2        Security comparison of mobile user access control mechanism ....... 159 
6.4.3        Comparison of the efficiency and coverage with details of VMs 
communication.................................................................................................. 160 
6.4.4 General drawbacks and comparison of security degree ..................... 167 
6.5 Summary ................................................................................................... 168 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN   CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS ...................... 169 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 169 
7.2 Research Summary .................................................................................... 169 
7.3 Research contribution ................................................................................ 173 
7.4 Research limitations .................................................................................. 175 
xii 
 
7.5 Future Works ............................................................................................. 176 






























List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Related works’ comparison ........................................................................ 46 
Table 2.2 Cloud simulators tools’ comparison .......................................................... 64 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of Performance evaluation Techniques ................................. 84 
 
Table 4.1 Detailed notations regarding the security metrics .................................... 105 
 
Table 6.1 Experimental configurations .................................................................... 144 
Table 6.2 Evaluating the efficiency and execution time on different configurations 
using Proxy-3S ......................................................................................................... 146 
Table 6.3 Evaluating the coverage and execution time on different configurations 
using Proxy-3S ......................................................................................................... 147 
Table 6.4 Efficiency comparisons on different configurations and VMs ................ 149 
Table 6.5 Coverage comparisons on different configurations and VMs ................. 153 
Table 6.6 Evaluating the execution time of SecNetworkCloudSim compared to 
NetworkCloudSim ................................................................................................... 157 
Table 6.7 Features comparison between Hash RSA-1024, Co-residency and the 
proposed Mobile User Access Control .................................................................... 159 
Table 6.8 Comparison for the smallest size configuration set between related work 
and the proposed work ............................................................................................. 165 
Table 6.9 Comparison for the moderate size configuration set between related work 
and the proposed work ............................................................................................. 165 
Table 6.10 Comparison for the largest size configuration set between related work 
and the proposed work ............................................................................................. 166 







List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Overview of Mobile Cloud Computing Environment ............................... 2 
Figure 1.2: Communication of intensive application tasks while deployed on Thin        
                   Virtual Machines ..................................................................................... 10 
Figure 1.3: Scope of research – Blue Area ................................................................ 12 
 
Figure 2.1: Architecture of Mobile Cloud Computing .............................................. 22 
Figure 2.2: Cloud Computing Deployment Models ................................................... 22 
Figure 2.3: Partitioning and Offloading of Mobile Application to the Cloud ........... 24 
Figure 2.4: Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Cloud Computing ....................... 28 
Figure 2.5: Virtualization layer in the cloud environment ......................................... 29 
Figure 2.6: Communication between two entities through a proxy ........................... 30 
Figure 2.7: Attacks roots in a virtualized environment .............................................. 33 
Figure 2.8: CloudSim Package Integrated Eclipse ..................................................... 57 
Figure 2.9: CloudSim architecture ............................................................................. 58 
Figure 2.10: Green Cloud architecture ....................................................................... 60 
Figure 2.11: iCanCloud architecture .......................................................................... 61 
Figure 2.12: secCloudSim architecture ...................................................................... 63 
 
Figure 3.1: Research Design ...................................................................................... 72 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Model.................................................................................... 75 
Figure 3.3: The Proposed Approach .......................................................................... 76 
Figure 3.4: Development Approach Process .............................................................. 77 
Figure 3.5: Java Eclipse IDE ...................................................................................... 79 
Figure 3.6: Secure Mobile User Control Access Policy ............................................ 81 
Figure 3.7: Secure Hypervisor Policy   ...................................................................... 82 
Figure 3.8: Secure VMs Communication Policy  ...................................................... 83 
Figure 3.9: NetworkCloudSim Package Integrated Eclipse ....................................... 87 
Figure 3.10: NetworkCloudSim Architecture  ........................................................... 88 
 
Figure 4.1: Computation example of attacks efficiency and coverage ...................... 97 
Figure 4.2: Overview of security architecture .......................................................... 101 
Figure 4.3: The functional model of security three policies Proxy-based approach 102 
xv 
 
Figure 4.4: Computation example of attacks efficiency and coverage using 
communication aspect .............................................................................................. 107 
Figure 4.5: Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption and decryption process ..................... 110 
Figure 4.6: Proxy-based policies details .................................................................. 113 
 
Figure 5.1: SecNetworkCloudSim architecture ....................................................... 125 
Figure 5.2: Results of secure user authentication with hash Diffie-Hellman 
schema ...................................................................................................................... 126 
Figure 5.3: SecNetworkCloudSim class diagram .................................................... 131 
Figure 5.4: SecNetworkCloudSim simulation execution workflow ........................ 135 
 
Figure 6.1: The architecture of distributed health care mobile application using 
Proxy-3S ................................................................................................................... 140 
Figure 6.2: Actions performed and communication flow among actors and tasks .. 141 
Figure 6.3: Increase of efficiency and coverage communication of the attacker..... 142 
Figure 6.4 Evaluation of efficiency on different configuration using Proxy-3S 
(with/without) secure communication ..................................................................... 146 
Figure 6.5: Evaluation of Coverage on different configuration using Proxy-3S 
(with/without) secure communication ..................................................................... 148 
Figure 6.6: Efficiency comparison in configuration 1 (300 VMs spread) ............... 150 
Figure 6.7: Efficiency comparison in configuration 2 (600 VMs spread) ............... 151 
Figure 6.8: Efficiency comparison in configuration 3 (900 VMs spread) ............... 151 
Figure 6.9: Efficiency comparison in configuration 4 (1200 VMs spread) ............. 152 
Figure 6.10: Efficiency comparison in configuration 5 (1500 VMs spread) ........... 152 
Figure 6.11: Coverage comparison in configuration 1 (300 VMs spread) .............. 154 
Figure 6.12: Coverage comparison in configuration 2 (600 VMs spread) .............. 155 
Figure 6.13: Coverage comparison in configuration 3 (900 VMs spread) .............. 155 
Figure 6.14: Coverage comparison in configuration 4 (1200 VMs spread) ............ 156 
Figure 6.15: Coverage comparison in configuration 5 (1500 VMs spread) ............ 156 
Figure 6.16: Evaluating the processing execution time of SecNetworkCloudSim 
compared to NetworkCloudSim using different configurations .............................. 158 
Figure 6.17: Intra and inter-communication of VMs of the co-located and remote 




List of Abbreviations 
AES                           Advanced Encryption Standard 
API   Application Programming Interface 
AWS   Amazon Web Service 
CC   Cloud Computing 
CSP   Cloud Service Provider 
CPU   Centric Processing Unit 
DH                             Diffie Hellman key exchange 
EC2    Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud 
GUI                            Graphical User Interface 
IDE   Integrated Development Environment 
IaaS   Infrastructure as a Service 
IP   Internet Protocol 
IT    Information Technology 
MAC                          Media access control 
MCC    Mobile Cloud Computing 
PaaS   Platform as a Service 
PB                              Public Key 
PV Private Key 
Proxy-3S Three policies Secure cloud Proxy 
PS    Prescriptive Study 
QoS                            Quality of Service 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RC   Research Clarification 
xvii 
 
S3                               Amazon Simple Storage Service 
SHA                           Secure Hash Algorithms 
SaaS   Software as a Service 
SLA   Service Level Agreement   
TCP   Transmission Control Protocol 
VM   Virtual Machine  






Nowadays, mobile cloud computing is considered as an important technology that has 
grown fast among individual and community of users. It combines cloud computing 
paradigm with mobile devices through wireless technology in order to avoid the 
devices’ restricts resources capacities and leveraging the cloud computing services 
offering [1, 2]. The mobile devices such as smartphone and tablets have several 
limitations in terms of resources capacities such as central processing unit (CPU), 
memory and storage space which inhibit the developers from providing powerful 
applications as well as hinder the users to enjoy the various mobile applications in their 
daily life [3, 4]. Integrating cloud computing services with mobile computing is an 
interesting solution to solve related issues. 
Cloud computing is an attractive technology that is known to have increasing 
importance for users by delivering services over the Internet. It is defined as an 
Information Technology (IT) paradigm that allows the user to exploit cloud services 
in an on-demand way [5, 6]. Three main services are provided: Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). IaaS is 
cloud computing architecture and infrastructure that provides users access to all 
computing resources in a virtualized environment. Such as servers, storage and 
networking. PaaS provides computing platform to clients such as programming 
languages, operating system, web server and others. Moreover, it provides platform 
development tools for user’s developers such as Google App Engine and Microsoft 
Azure. SaaS offers on-demand pay-per-use of cloud application to users. Whereas, 
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these applications are independent and it is unnecessary to install on personal 
computer. In addition, cloud computing has many benefits in terms of scalability, data 
availability, reliability, cost reduction for cloud user [5, 7]. Meanwhile, with the 
increasing daily use of mobile devices, cloud services are becoming more and more 
attractive for mobile users. 
Mobile cloud computing allows users to move and upload their applications, services, 
and data on the shared cloud servers for exploiting large storage capacity and high-
computing resources when running intensive applications and remote data storage that 
exhaust the battery life of the mobile devices. Figure 1.1 shows the architecture of the 
mobile cloud computing environment and the related services leveraged.  
 
Figure 1.1. Overview of Mobile Cloud Computing Environment  
Recently, the use of the mobile devices is not only retained for simple applications but 
also complex and crucial applications which deal with a sensitive data with various 
multimedia contents (e.g. texts, images, audios and videos), also banking application, 
health, transport, and others. Applications, services, and data are accessed, delivered 
and used over the Internet, instead of mobile devices, and are paid by cloud customer 
or provider [8]. The moving of clients’ services and data to the cloud technology raise 
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many security challenges especially data security and privacy protection that become 
major and serious concerns because data is located in different distributed places. 
Data security and privacy are considered as the most barriers that hinder the 
widespread emergence of the cloud. Several and various commercial business and 
organizations still unwilling to move their data and resource computing management 
to the third-party Cloud Service Providers (CSP) [9]. Usually, the migration of the 
user's application services/data is occurred by the help of the virtualization layer by 
moving out the data from the mobile device to the virtual machines for processing on 
the remote cloud.  
Various users’ virtual machines are running on the same cloud host when they share 
the same cloud resources, which lead to more additional security risks like violating 
the data once they share the same Memory or CPU [10, 11]. Thus, an important 
question to be highlighted is whether the other cloud virtual machines’ clients are 
trusted or not. Currently, data security and privacy issues have been studied by many 
researchers for ensuring the tenant of data confidentiality and integrity of the cloud 
providers. However, most of the solutions proposed are not practical due to the critical 
change in the cloud platform which eliminate side channels and removing such clocks 
as well as the hypervisor [12]. 
In this chapter, we present the problem statement of data/services security and privacy 
of the mobile user using the cloud computing services on the virtualized environment, 
also outlines the research questions and objectives. Then we give the scope of the 
research, including the contributions and significance of the study. Finally, the chapter 
ends with a summary and provides an idea about the next chapter. 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
Recently, mobile computing is known as a fast-growing utilization of people's daily 
life. However, the main challenge that faced this rapid advancement is the constrained 
and limited mobile devices’ resources. The mobile computing might be improved by 
integrating with cloud computing which leads to a new technology called Mobile 
Cloud Computing (MCC) [13, 14]. 
MCC is presented as services offered for the mobile computing environment in order 
to avail the cloud services characteristics such as broad network access, elasticity, on-
demand self-service and resource pooling (e.g., cloud providers serve multiple tenants 
with their needs). Although the MCC has several advantages for both cloud service 
providers and mobile users, it also challenged by many critical issues such as security 
and privacy of the mobile user's data offloaded on the cloud [13, 15]. 
Security is considered a major challenge for MCC environment. The mobile cloud 
security issues are inherited from cloud computing, so they are the same issues but 
also more critical on MCC because of incapacity and limited devices’ resources (e.g., 
lack of CPU capability) to process intensive malware application or complex algorithm 
to protect the sensitive data as like personal computers. There is a crucial need for a 
lightweight framework that guarantees security with minimum processing and 
communications overhead on mobile devices [16]. The tenants’ worries are 
concentrated on the migration to the cloud, which might be faced with additional risks 
once they are sharing the same cloud resources with other tenants [13]. In MCC, the 
cloud service providers offer the sharing of their resources to mobile users through one 




Thin virtual machine (or phone clone) is a virtual machine (VM) which is pre-installed 
once the mobile user migrates their services or data to the cloud for storage and 
processing. More precisely, the VMs are used to increase the utilization rate of cloud 
provider platform and to manage the maintenance of application computing more 
easily. However, researchers in [17] showed that virtualization had brought several 
security threats and issues. Many serious and various attacks have been illustrated in 
[18] that affect the virtualized systems such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks when 
this kind of attack hits insipid information like workload statistics to know whether the 
system is vulnerable or not. We restrict our attention in this work to wide critical 
common attacks such as co-resident (co-location) attacks, distributed attacks, and the 
hypervisor attacks which affect the VMs or known as Thin VMs and violate its 
sensitive information. Moreover, talking to co-resident VMs (i.e.: VMs running on the 
same physical server) are logically isolated from each other, but attackers can build 
many side channels to avoid the isolation and retrieve sensitive data from legal VMS 
(legal mobile user). Researchers in [17] have shown that an attacker can reach 40% of 
efficiency, which means that an attacker when spread 10 VMs attacker, 4 of them can 
co-locate with target VMs (victim). 
Many solutions have been proposed to solve these security issues. Firstly, eliminating 
the side-channel attacks against cloud system is one of solution which is proposed by 
[19, 20] to mitigate the risks of VMs side channel. Also, removing and adding some 
components for the hardware layer has been proposed by [21, 22, 23]. However, all 
the proposed methods have common drawbacks that require high deployment cost in 
terms of high execution time and high computation complexity for implementing and 
not immediately adopted under the continuous changing of cloud platforms [12]. This 
6 
 
is the first reason that motivates us to find a low-cost solution-based software 
implementation and its immediate practical realization and not hardware.   
Secondly, some works presented by [24, 25] consist of increasing the difficulties to 
establish co-resident attacks using the network-based measurement (e.g., the same 
VMs IP addresses are considered co-resident). In these attacks, the hypervisor is the 
target to get the IP address of VMs. Such solutions can be broken and not a simple IP 
address hiding can protect victim VMs (i.e., the attackers do not rely only on VMs’ IP 
addresses) [12]. Moreover, in [26, 27] the authors have presented techniques consists 
of detecting the malicious VMs attacks (abnormalities features happen for CPU and 
RAM once the attackers want to retrieve sensitive information from VMs). Migrating 
the VMs from a host to another host on the cloud is a proposed solution by [28, 29], 
but the solution will lead to more power consumption as well as the quality of service 
degradation such as Service Level Agreement (SLA) between cloud’s client and the 
cloud service provider. Using VM allocation policies is one of our interests which can 
cause difficulties for establishing co-resident attacks. Such policies have been only 
proposed in [12, 30]. 
Our main motivation in this study is solving the data security and privacy issue. More 
precisely, protecting the user sensitive data in terms of integrity and confidentiality on 
MCC environment as well as particularly better exploiting virtualization-based 
techniques. The specific motivations that encourage us to do research in this area are 
based on two main reasons.  
First, most of the above described related works provide mechanisms for dealing with 
some common attacks and hardware-based mechanisms which is costly to be adopted 
due to high-computation time with algorithm complexity that needs of changing the 
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current cloud platform. Secondly, some of the proposed mechanisms such as [12] 
worked on virtual machine allocation policy to defend against well-known attacks 
which are called co-residency attacks. This policy is one of our interests in this work 
due to the important role that can play once allocate the VMs. However, all the above-
proposed works present some weaknesses in terms of robustness against attacks that 
target the VMs deploying on the different distributed host (physical server) and when 
VMs deploying on the same mobile devices or on distributed on different mobile 
devices. 
The main aim of the work is to reach a high level of robustness to protect the data 
integrity and confidentiality in unsecured networks against different attacks (co-
resident (co-location) attacks, distributed attacks, and the hypervisor attacks). Finally, 
we would like to solve the most security and data privacy side of the mobile user VMs 
ranging from the mobile device till offload to the cloud and until received by the 
authorized receiver. We will introduce an efficient proxy-based security technique that 
protects the distributed mobile application from being attacked once any transaction 
happens. We need to ensure whole data security and privacy protection of sensitive 
data of the mobile client application via a secure proxy. 
1.3 Problem statement  
Virtualization is a very promising mechanism in cloud computing that increases the 
efficiency of exploiting shared hardware resources such as memory, cache, and CPU 
of servers. The virtualization is defined in the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), where 
many data centers contain various servers which deploying Virtual Machines (VMs) 
that comprise huge data amount of users. An image of VMs of mobile devices also 
called phone clones are pre-created on these servers while offloading and performing 
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mobile user’s intensive applications and tasks [13]. Similarly, unauthorized users can 
deploy their VMs and obtain data from the legitimate user by constructing many 
malicious side channels using the same sharing resources (CPU cache, memory bus).   
The main goal of virtualization is to run different virtual machines of different mobile 
users at the same time or simultaneously. Thanks to the Virtual Machine Manager 
(VMM) so-called Hypervisor that ensures the management (e.g., creating, deleting, 
and migrating) of different VMs (phone-clones) and the isolation from each other. 
However, the hypervisor vulnerabilities can be exploited by an adversary to obtain 
access to users' virtual machines [18, 31]. 
Frequently, the VM of different mobile users executed on the same physical host are 
logically isolated from each other. However, malevolent users can escape the logical 
isolation while sharing the same resources (CPU, memory, and cache) and capture 
sensitive and private information like crypto keys from co-location virtual machines 
[17, 32]. Some proposed solutions [22, 23, 33] attempt to tackle this type of threat 
“VM to VM attacks” by ignoring the side channel constructed between co-location 
VMs which is not allowed by the cloud policies [23]. Moreover, the suggested 
frameworks demand major changes to be implemented in the existing cloud 
commercial platform. Consequently, the proposed methods are impractical due to high 
deployment cost (i.e.: high execution time and high computation complexity). 
The previous studies show that the attackers need to co-locate their malicious virtual 
machines with the VMs target on the host cloud before they would be able to make 
their side channels to violate any useful information [12, 17, 25, 26]. Thus, using the 
VM allocation policy is one of the crucial factors that cloud providers can control and 
influence the possibility of co-location [12, 30]. So, researchers in [12] have attempted 
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to solve the problem by finding a robust and secure virtual machine allocation policy 
that increases difficulties for attackers to co-locate malicious VMs with their targets 
and mitigates the possibility to perform co-location. However, the proposed works 
focused on the impact of how many VMs’ attacker needs to be launched by malicious 
users to co-locate with the target legal VMs. This is one of main reasons that allowing 
start and deploy a limited number of users’ VMs in the cloud’s servers as well as 
reduce the co-resident attacks. This kind of solution may enhance the security 
protection of deployed VMs, but effectively will affect the quality of cloud service 
provider (i.e.: scalability) which decreases the Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
between a cloud provider and a user. Moreover, the proposed works also studied 
strategies for co-locating attackers’ under different VM allocation policies. However, 
if the VM’s attacker can success to co-locate with legal VM then VM attacker built 
malicious side-channel and get data from target VMs. Therefore, it is preferable to 
come up with an efficient approach that ensures the VMs protection even if the VMs 
co-location occurs in the cloud’s servers. 
The aim of this thesis is to tackle the hypervisor and VMs threats by combining the 
VM allocation policy with the hypervisor protection policy to guarantee both the phone 
clone integrity and hypervisor integrity. Indeed, we believe that such hybrid-policy 
would provide large protection against co-resident VM and VMM attacks.  
The VMs communicate with each other to exchange private and sensitive information 
(e.g., distrusted application executed in the different host). We studied the limitations 
of the existing virtualization security co-location techniques proposed in the literature 
such as the work of researchers in  [12]. We have identified that the main limitation is 
the absence of protecting sensitive information exchanged between mobile 
application’s tasks deployed on different VMs on the cloud (i.e.: there is no mechanism 
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that protects the data from being stolen while interacting between the VMs). For 
example, in Figure 1.2 the VM 1 in host 1 communicates with VM 1 in host 2 to 
exchange information which can lead the attacker to steal the private data exchanged 
between them. Hence, the only solution which was proposed by [34] is a hardware-
based technique with a high-cost barrier. Thus, we aim to design a new solution 
referred as a proxy for secure distributed VMs on mobile cloud computing not only 
ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of sensitive data exchanged among multi-
VMs data but also reducing the cost in terms of security management time and 
computation complexity (e.g. fast security management time, low computation 
complexity). Thus, we believe that our study is going to provide protection for the 
mobile users’ information against different attacks (e.g.: hypervisor attacks, co-
location attacks and distributed attacks). Moreover, in the evaluation, we are going to 
use benchmark data to compare our work and validate it according to two metrics for 
measuring the attacks: coverage and efficiency that mentioned by authors in [5]. 
 
Figure 1.2. Communication of intensive application’s tasks while deployed on Thin 
Virtual Machines  
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1.4 Research Questions 
The main question of this research is how to mitigate the VM Co-resident and the 
hypervisor attacks, also the attacks on remote VMs located on a different host. Other 
secondary questions for this research are willing to be addressed:  
1. How to define the identity of the remote client and how to manage the 
privacy and confidentiality of VMs allocation requests of the mobile client 
on the cloud?  
2. What are the methods that can be exploited for ensuring both virtual 
machine integrity and hypervisor security? 
3. How to protect the exchanged information between the VMs (distributed 
application) deployed in different host on the cloud side?  
1.5 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to enhance the security of users’ sensitive 
information in the mobile cloud computing environment exactly on the virtualization 
layer. A new secure approach is proposed named Proxy 3-S, which combines three 
main secure policies.  In order to achieve this major goal, the following objectives are 
proposed: 
1. To design a mobile user control access policy for preventing both 
unauthorized access to the cloud service provider and preventing the spread 
of malevolent users’ VMs. 
2. To design a secure VMs manager policy which protects the VMs allocation 
on the cloud hosts as well as protects the hypervisor from getting retrieved 
by unauthorized malicious VMs.  
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3. To design a VMs communication policy on the cloud using three 
hierarchical trust levels that guaranty the privacy and the confidentiality of 
sensitive information exchanged between VMs.  
1.6 Research Scope 
Cloud computing contains four main deployment modes: public could, private cloud, 
community cloud and hybrid cloud. The security in the private cloud is highly 
preserved compared to the public cloud [35, 36]. Our scope starts with focusing on the 
public cloud as an interesting point of our work. Then, we highlight the data security 
and privacy and we discuss as follows:  
Security and privacy in MCC include many scopes of research that motivate 
researchers to work on them. It has many sectors inside such as data security, 
partitioning and offloading security, mobile cloud application security, mobile device 
security, data privacy, location privacy, identity privacy. For us, our scope of the 
presented work particularly focused on virtualization-based security and mobile 







Figure 1.3. Scope of research – Blue Area  
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For ensuring the security of VMs data of distributed mobile application tasks which 
deployed on both the same and different host on the cloud is considered as a 
challenging issue. Several related works [37, 38, 39, 12, 40] have been proposed with 
many mechanisms for providing security and privacy of target virtual machines’ 
information from the malicious attackers.  
We have mentioned two main approaches: (1)-the approaches that concentrated on the 
attack against VMs Co-location on the same host of the cloud and (2)-the approaches 
that concentrated on the attacks against information transferred among cloud VMs. 
Despite this, these solutions have provided many benefits; they still need to protect 
information exchanged between different cloud VMs deployed on different hosts. 
Thus, the main scope of our work is to enhance existing approaches with strong 
security mechanisms of VMs shared distributed information deployed whether on the 
same or different hosts on the cloud. Furthermore, the level of our work is issued on 
the security of VMs data in infrastructure service, while both security on services 
(software/platform) of the cloud model will be planned for future directions works. 
Moreover, it must also be mentioned that the scope of this research is limited to VMs 
integrity while deployed on either the same or different cloud’s hosts. In particular, we 
ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the distributed applications’ data that process 
inside VMs. While the security of the cloud services model (software and platform) 
will be planned for future directions works. 
1.7 Research Contribution 
Our research serves to connect multi-stakeholder distributed mobile applications (i.e.: 
different departments in a hospital, distributed banking branches) securely and save 
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the integrity and confidentiality of exchanged sensitive and important information 
(e.g., the financial information, health records). 
The major contributions of this research are:  
1- The proposed user control access policy aims for preventing the access of 
illegitimate mobile users that would leverage the cloud service provider and 
allocate their malicious virtual machines.  
2- The proposed secure VMs manager policy aims to guaranty both the hypervisor 
security and thin VMs integrity by preventing the allocation of malicious VMs 
on the cloud host.  
3- The secure VMs communication policy for ensuring the secure exchanges of 
sensitive data among VMs deployed on different cloud’s hosts.  
4- The extended security layers on NetworkCloudSim architecture aims to model 
the security of distributed tasks deployed on different hosts and simulate VMs 
based security intensive tasks scenarios. 
1.8 Significance of the Study   
The benefit of this research is to enhance the security level for sharing sensitive data 
on distributed mobile applications by describing the privacy level of exchanged data 
between different virtual machines on the cloud and helps us to adapt the well-known 
security VM-allocations policies to model a realistic system. 
This research proposes multiple policies in a mobile cloud computing environment. 
The primary concern of these policies is to enhance the security of infrastructure 
service for a mobile user that leveraging from the cloud computing resources. This 
would be achieved by reducing the efficiency and coverage of the attacks against the 
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virtual machine, which contains sensitive data of the mobile user. More precisely, 
virtual machines or phone clones can be distributed on many hosts in order to balance 
the workload between the servers on the different datacenter. The virtual machines are 
allocated, whether on the same or different hosts can be stolen by retrieving their data 
from another virtual machine attacker. These virtual machines are managed by a 
component called either hypervisor or virtual machine manager.  
The detailed significance of our study is to securely allocate the mobile users’ virtual 
machines by controlling and prohibiting the access of malicious users (i.e.: attackers) 
to the cloud services. Moreover, defending the hypervisor from the attacks which have 
as target the authorized virtual machines (i.e.: legitimate mobile user) and also the co-
resident VMs hosted on the same host. Furthermore, ensuring the data user from being 
retrieved when it transfers from the mobile application to the virtual machine hosted 
on the cloud environment and also protecting the exchange of data between different 
mobile application tasks deployed on the cloud host. We believe such proposed 
policies would prevent mobile users from being attacked and lost their sensitive data 
or information.  
1.9 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis has been organized into six chapters. The resume of each chapter is 
provided as follows:  
Chapter One gives an overview of the research interest. It also includes the research 
motivation that persuades us to contribute to this type of research concept. The 
problem statement of the research is also introduced in this chapter as well as both 
main and secondary research questions. The chapter also states the research objectives 
and the scope that restricts and specifies the limit of our work. Concluding the chapter, 
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the main research contribution and the significance of research have been mentioned 
as well.   
Chapter Two provides a literature review of the area of the research. It covers the 
general literature about the important concepts of mobile cloud computing, security 
threats, offloading and virtualization technology issues. Moreover, the chapter 
illustrates the virtualization attacks roots that explain how the attackers can achieve 
their malicious goals. Furthermore, the chapter presents a section that reviews and 
compares the previous solutions presented to tackle the research problem and gives the 
strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism and policy. Moreover, the chapter 
discusses the cloud simulator tools and gives a details comparison between them in 
order to well understanding both the advantages and limitations of each tool. Finally, 
the chapter reviews the Diffie–Hellman algorithm and the various Hash functions as 
well as the main reason for using Hash-Diffie Hellman technique in this research.  
Chapter Three addresses the research methodology used to conduct this work.  The 
chapter starts by introducing the research phases and the conceptual model of the 
proposed approach. Furthermore, the selecting tool for conducting the simulation 
experiments and evaluation will be provided and illustrated in detail. The chapter 
defines the security performance metrics being using in the evaluation and validation 
of the proposed approach.  A conclusion of this chapter is included that opens the door 
to chapter four.      
Chapter Four presents the secure cloud proxy named Three policies Secure cloud 
Proxy (Proxy-3S) proposed in this research work. This chapter provides in detail three 
secure policies for controlling the VMs’ user access to the cloud services and 
preventing the leakage of the sensitive data that is processed inside VMs on a mobile 
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cloud environment. The chapter discusses the co-resident attacks and security metrics 
for measures the performances of the proposed secure proxy. Further, our improved 
security metrics are given in order to evaluate the distributed attacks (communicating 
VMs attack). The problem definition stating how to reduce the attackers’ coverage and 
efficiency without reducing the number of users that intend to leverage the cloud 
services is provided, including the security actors modeling. In addition, a technical 
section for explaining the proxy usage of Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption and 
decryption process is presented. Finally, the chapter ends with details algorithms of 
the proposed three secure policies. 
Chapter Five provides the proposed SecNetworkCloudSim: an extensible simulation 
tool based on NetworkCloudSim for securing the distributed mobile application over 
the cloud. The SecNetworkCloudSim is a secure, mobile and open-source simulation 
tool that preserves high confidentiality access to the shared data hosted on a mobile 
device and over distributed cloud’s servers. Moreover, a section illustrating the 
diagram class and simulation execution workflow of the novel proposed tool is 
presented in this chapter.  
Chapter Six presents the approach’s implementation and evaluation using an 
intensive distributed healthcare mobile application. The chapter provides various 
comparisons between our approach results and the results of the related works in order 
to prove the effectiveness and performance of the proposed secure approach. In 
addition, analysis and evaluation of the SecNetworkCloudSim compared to 
NetworkCloudSim is briefly discussed in its dedicated section.  The chapter ends by 
presenting a security comparison of the proposed mobile user access control 
mechanism and other related works as well as describing the general drawbacks and 
comparison of research works’ security degree.  
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Chapter Seven concludes this thesis by stating the research summary along with 

















LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction  
The main objective of this chapter is to present a comprehensive literature review and 
background of the previous works regarding the research area of security in the mobile 
cloud computing environment.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the concept of mobile cloud 
computing and its services. It provides security and privacy challenges in mobile cloud 
computing. Further, it gives a definition of virtualization, its benefits and security 
issues regarding cloud computing. Section 2.3 provides a clear explanation of the 
utility of using the concept of proxy. Section 2.4 presents the virtualization attacks 
classification and details about the attacks on the virtualized system for well 
understanding the topic related security issues. Section 2.5 details the different 
approaches and techniques proposed to tackle the virtualization attacks and a critical 
review of the existing frameworks. Section 2.6 provides a comparative study and gives 
the strength and weaknesses of each solution. Further, this chapter presents a critical 
review of the cloud simulators in Section 2.7 and provides a comparison regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of each tool. Section 2.8 reviews the Diffie Hellman 
algorithm and Hash functions proposed in the literature.  Finally, Section 2.9 concludes 
the chapter.  
2.2 Mobile Cloud Computing              
Nowadays, mobile devices are considered essential facilities in our life. People are 
dramatically using mobile devices in their daily life. In 2014, the number of mobile 
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users was growing faster from 5.6 billion up to 6.2 million in 2018 and the number of 
users’ also still significantly increased, which means 84% of the population will use 
smartphones and tablets [41]. Many applications whether for entertainment or work 
running on mobile devices need power processing which exhausts the battery life. 
More precisely, intensive mobile applications like augmented reality, anti-virus, video 
editor and face detection need high-power CPU, memory, and high-storage capacity 
to efficiently perform application tasks or to manage the data. However, mobile 
devices are constrained by their limited resources and cannot be able to proceed with 
huge computing like desktop computers [42]. 
New technology has started to emerge. The main idea comes to integrate mobile 
technology into cloud computing to resolve the problems related to mobile devices 
which appear a new powerful technology called Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) 
[43]. To give a clear definition of the mobile cloud, it should before understand the 
Cloud computing model.  
Cloud computing is a paradigm that provides services like computing, software, and 
storage on-demand manner instead of the product [44]. This means that computing 
provided as utility or service for the end-user and the resources are always available 
for clients once they need (availability). International companies such as Amazon, 
Microsoft and Google have been invested in this technology by providing their own 
strong, reliable and cost-efficiency cloud platform for users, where services are made 
to appear anytime and everywhere with the pay as you use fashion which offers more 
benefits whether for small or big companies to consume the remote computing and 
resources data storage on-demand in the datacenters.  
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2.2.1 Mobile Cloud Computing Concept 
Turning to mobile cloud computing, many definitions can be presented to illustrate 
this new paradigm. MCC is a combination of mobile computing and cloud computing 
[3] where mobile devices take the benefits from cloud resources using a set of 
techniques in order to leave out their constraints and getting the mobile devices more 
resistible in terms of power consumption such as extending the battery life. Other 
mentioned definitions have described that mobile cloud is the concept that refers to an 
infrastructure where the data computing and the data storage moved outside the mobile 
device which means on the cloud [15]. Figure 2.1 presents the architecture of mobile 
cloud computing. 
There are three main services in cloud computing, the first one is Software as a Service 
(SaaS) which delivers the applications as a service for the client or the end-user over 
the internet [3, 45]. Such kinds of these applications: DropBox, Gmail, Microsoft 
Office 356, Rackspace, Salesforce and SAP Business ByDesign. The second service 
is Platform as a Service (PaaS) which gives the opportunity for developing applications 
in a platform using Application Programming Interfaces (API). Google App Engine, 
Microsoft Azure, and Amazon web services are the primary players known in this 
layer. The third main service in the cloud environment is Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS), this layer contains the hardware resources such as datacenters which provides 
storage and computation facilities using the virtualization for sharing the computing 
resources such as CPU, Memory of the cloud servers. Flexiscale [46], Amazon EC2 









Figure 2.1. Architecture of Mobile Cloud Computing (Adopted From [16]) 
2.2.2 Cloud Computing Deployment Mode and Pertaining Security    
Cloud computing is consisting of four main types of deployment modes named: public 
clouds, private clouds, hybrid clouds, and community clouds [44]. Each type has its 
own characteristics. Figure 2.2 shows the different cloud model deployment. For the 
public cloud, the cloud providers offer the resources (Network, Servers, Application) 
as a service for a general organization or individual for free or certain small chargeable 
amount. The disadvantage of the public cloud is that data of the tenants (costumers) 






Figure 2.2. Cloud Computing Deployment Models  
The second type is a private cloud. The private clouds are implemented only for being 
used by one enterprise or organization. The infrastructure of this type of cloud can be 
23 
 
managed either by an external provider or the organization itself. Further, the security, 
reliability, and performance (Quality of Service) are higher than the cloud public 
deployment model type [4, 49, 11]. The third type is a hybrid cloud. The hybrid cloud 
is the combination of the two types of cloud models or three types, which aim to cover 
the limitation of each model. For instance, in infrastructure service, some of the parts 
are processed in cloud private such as sensitive information, where other parts are 
performed on the cloud public. These benefits provide more flexibility for the 
organizations and guarantee strong security and control over the tenant’s data [4, 49]. 
The last cloud model is community cloud, wherein this model type, the infrastructure 
service is shared between various tenants and organizations which targeting a specific 
concern such as security requirement and compliance regards [11, 50].                           
2.2.3 Offloading  
The execution of mobile applications is considered as computational intensive tasks 
that consumed large energy of mobile devices. Indeed, this kind of challenge has been 
defeated by the offloading technique [51]. The tasks and the computational intensive 
application are transferred to the cloud (remote server nodes) for processing and the 
results back to the mobile terminals afterward [52].  
The use of remote servers leads to leverage the huge processing capacity also extends 
the battery life by saving the energy [53]. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of the steps 
of the offloading process “partitioning, migration and execution” from the mobile 













Figure 2.3. Partitioning and Offloading of Mobile Application to the Cloud 
Before the mobile intensive application outsourced from the mobile device to the 
cloud, it was divided into many parts (or tasks) as presented in Figure 2.3. Some tasks 
are still executed on the mobile device due to the necessity of using local resources 
such as cameras, positioning and location system, and other sensors. Moreover, the 
tasks which have lower resources consumption can be performed in the mobile device. 
Otherwise, highly intensive resource tasks are migrated to high computing capacity 
(cloud) [54].               
2.2.4 An Overview of Mobile Cloud Computing Challenges   
Both mobile devices consumers and cloud service providers have taken advantage of 
the mobile cloud computing environment. However, the MCC stills face different 
challenges that hinder it and make it more difficult compared to Cloud Computing. In 
this section, we give a short brief about the challenges that have faced by the mobile 
cloud before we introduce our related works. 
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1- Mobile devices resources limitations: mobile devices still face various 
limitations: storage capacity, processing power, and battery power compared 
with a desktop computer. Even though there have been improvements in 
different aspects of mobile devices such as CPU, memory and battery life, 
they are incapable to run the power-intensive application in their local 
physical resources [55, 13].     
2- Heterogeneity: in the environment of mobile cloud, various mobile 
application services are interacted and running on different processor 
architectures and operating systems, and communicating through various 
protocols and communication supports. This may affect the quality of service 
like application response time, communication quality, and service delivery 
[14, 13].         
3- Elasticity: similar to cloud computing, elasticity and scalability are the main 
needed factors in MCC services. The cloud services provider needs to meet 
and satisfy all the mobile user requirements when they are over available 
resources. The interruption of services due to resource unavailability cause 
many problems between the end-user and cloud providers [13].        
4- Applications services issues: the limited resources of mobile devices 
prevent the intensive task to be freely deployed and executed. However, the 
offloading technique needs to be applied for migrating the computationally 
intensive task from the device to the cloud environment [56, 57]. The most 
intensive task is running on the cloud server and a small part of the 
computational processing is executed in the mobile device. Consequently, 
the mobile user may face delay which affects negatively the quality of 
service [13, 58].           
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5- Security and privacy challenges:  Compared to cloud computing, security 
and privacy issues are increasing in MCC environment [59]. Therefore, 
running intensive applications over vast distances against malware within 
mobile devices are very complicated due to the constrained resources. Thus, 
executing complex algorithms is inconvenient as like normal computer.  For 
instance, various intensive applications will be communicating over vast 
distances, the need for secure communications is critical; otherwise, 
sensitive data and information would be put at risk. Also, communications 
and mobility should not be tracked; otherwise, it would violate privacy [14, 
16]. 
2.2.5 Security and Privacy Requirements in MCC 
United State National defense have defined the general security and privacy 
requirements for MCC, which are mentioned in the following [13]. 
1- Confidentiality: confidentiality is referring to keep the user’s data secret and 
safe in the cloud and it considers as one main security and privacy requirement 
[60]. Accordingly, mobile users have risks once avail the cloud services. As 
the data is transmitted and received within a public network, also executed and 
stored in public cloud datacenters, there is a possibility of retrieving the data 
by unauthorized or malevolent users.   
2- Integrity: the integrity is ensuring the data consistency and accuracy related 
to users in the cloud side once is stored on the service providers. Whereas, the 
alteration of sensitive data is prohibited by unauthorized users and it leads to 
various users’ losses such us their business [61]. 
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3- Availability: ensuring the availability for mobile users means that all cloud 
services must be always available for users at any time and everywhere 
according to mobile user’s needs and their usage contexts [62]. Ensuring the 
availability includes prohibiting the different type of attacks which destabilize 
the availability of services. 
4- Access control and authentication: authentication is the operation of 
identification of user correct identity [63, 64]. After the process of 
authentication is successful, it is necessary to identify the resources to which 
they have access and what type of execution can execute by the mobile user, 
such as viewing, editing, or deleting. These restricted operations called control 
access [65].  
5- Privacy: Privacy is ensured directly or indirectly while the requirements stated 
above are checked. Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication are three 
needed objectives that preserve the privacy of the cloud service of mobile users 
[66, 67].                 
2.2.6 Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Cloud Computing 
Mobile cloud computing uses many techniques such as offloading, partitioning, 
virtualization, and mobile cloud-based application, outsourced storage in order to 
serve and process mobile users [68, 69]. However, these techniques which have 
various benefits for mobile devices, lead to several new security challenges that 
inherited from the cloud computing security’s drawbacks that affect the mobile user 
on many sides [70, 71]. 
There are various defiances which have been discussed above. Security and privacy 
defiances are becoming more critical than other challenges due to many reasons such 
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as remote distributed cloud processing and storage where the sensitive data resided on 
the cloud, the user data transmission of over network with the heterogeneous 
environment through various protocols, communication technologies, also the limited 
resources of the mobile devices [72]. Figure 2.4 depicts the main security and privacy 






Figure 2.4. Security and Privacy Issues in Mobile Cloud Computing  
2.2.7 Virtualization Security on MCC 
In MCC, cloud services are provided for mobile users using virtualization technologies 
[73, 74]. IT research organization (InfoTech) considers that the distributed host on 
different datacenters leverages only 20% of the full capacity without virtualization. 
The virtualization process can increase hardware utilization (efficiency) between 60% 
and 80% [75]. The virtualization is defined as a middle layer between the software and 
hardware layers in the cloud servers that allows the cloud provider to efficiently exploit 
their services and computing resources [18]. These resources can be shared among 
multiple virtual machines in order to run them simultaneously (at the same time) and 
share also benefits from available servers’ resources (e.g. CPU, network bandwidth, 




In the cloud end, once the mobile task is offloaded, an image of virtual machine of the 
mobile device (called also phone clone) is pre-installed for processing the mobile 
user’s data and application which augment the efficiency of the cloud environment and 
decrease the maintenance overhead on the mobile devices [13, 77, 78]. Therefore, 
running the phone clones of mobile devices on the same server and isolate them is the 







Figure 2.5. Virtualization layer in the cloud environment  
Cloud computing has commonly used virtualization and leveraged from virtual 
machines mechanisms. For the cloud client, virtual machines help to tear out the 
maintenance of computing resources from the client device itself and enabling 
scalability of resources (enough to accept any added functionality at any given time). 
For the cloud providers, virtual machine increases the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of the hardware’s utilization rate [12, 81]. However these benefits, virtualization 
technique when applied on MCC, brings new security risks such as unauthorized 
access from malicious VMs, VMs to VMs attacks, the confidentiality of mobile users 
data, challenges within VM monitor and communication in a virtualized environment 
[18, 82]. Hence, ensuring security mechanism that prevents leakage of sensitive data 
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and information from legitimate phone clones is not an easy task. Many researchers 
have undertaken to develop frameworks, policies, and approaches against this kind of 
challenge to ensure the security aspects for the mobile users. These methods are mainly 
focused on how to ignore the side channels attacks between VMs while the malicious 
VMs access the cloud servers [22, 23, 21, 33]. However, all the methods proposed 
need fundamental changes to the current commercial platform and they are not 
practical and not immediately deployed [83].     
2.3 Concept of Proxy and Utility 
In general, a proxy is considered as a software or computer system that works like an 
intermediary for requests from users would leverage the resources from other servers 
[84, 85]. The users connect to the proxy and requesting some services such as file, web 
page, connection, or other available resources from various servers [86]. Meanwhile, 
the proxy evaluates the requests in order to control and simplify their complexity as 
well as provide the anonymity and facilitating the access to the servers ‘contents [87, 








Figure 2.6. Communication between two entities through a proxy 
In security aspects, the proxies are used for protecting against different operating 
system attacks and Web server attacks which enhance the security level for sharing 
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and accessing the resources [89, 90, 91]. In Figure 2.6, an example of two computers 
communicating with each other through a third proxy which helps to guaranty privacy 
(Bob does not know whether the information is going to Alice or another one). So, the 
proxy takes the responsibility of providing the information to the legitimate party.           
The reason for using a proxy in our work because of the need for an advanced approach 
based on proxy’s architecture in order to monitor, control and secure the sensitive data 
of users’ virtual machines on the mobile cloud computing environment. We can use 
another security approaches such as encryption/decryption [92, 93] and secure broker 
based trust [94, 95], but we crucially need a separate module which can manage the 
security aspects and filter the virtual machines as well as blocks the attackers who 
would intercept or retrieve the user information on the cloud’ servers. Moreover, we 
keep the function of allocating the virtual machines to the hypervisor layer which 
consider as a complex task. 
2.4 Virtualized System Attacks Classification 
The virtualization has various benefits for the MCC environment. It also has many 
drawbacks that introduce new security concerns [96, 97]. Among these concerns are 
two crucial attacks (i.e.: resources sharing between thin VM and hypervisor attacks) 
that would be handled by the presented work. The taxonomy of the general threats in 
the virtualized system must be provided to clarify which threat model that we would 
tackle.  
There are five main types of threats that can attack four layers of the virtualized 
environment. The first lower-layer dedicated to introduce the hardware attacks. In this 
kind of threat, the attackers try directly to access the memory for modifying or reading 
the virtual machine monitor space and violate the content of the legitimate VM [18, 
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98]. The second layer is the Hypervisor layer, this type of threat is mainly used to gain 
the full control of thin virtual machines by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the 
hypervisor [18, 99]. The third layer is the Virtualization layer, when the attackers 
exploit the virtualization benefits to retrieve sensitive data from VMs inside the same 
host cloud (co-resident attacks) [18, 100]. The fourth layer is Kernel layer, these 
attacks are destined to operating system to get the full control of the system [18, 101, 
102]. The last layer is the Application layer, where the attackers inject malicious code 
into the tenant's application for executing it [13, 22, 103, 104]. 
The second and third layer is the interest of this thesis. The attacks on the virtualization 
layer which include co-resident threats have been studied by several researchers and 
try to tackle them by changing the architecture of the current cloud platform [20, 22, 
23, 33, 105]. However, these solutions are not immediately practical. It has been shown 
that co-resident attacks can achieve a high efficiency percentage ranging by 40 % or 
higher [17], which means half of the attackers' VM numbers can co-locate with 
legitimate VMs. There are two types of co-resident attacks that have whether a specific 
goal or not [12]. Hence, the attackers who have not a specific target, their objective is 
to get disturbed cloud platform capacity and resources by providing unfair share 
among the virtual machines.    
2.4.1 Attacks Roots in Virtualized System 
In this section, we give the possible attacks in a virtualized environment. Our research 
work is constrained by two threats of co-resident attacks and hypervisor attacks, which 
are the essential parts of our research work. We consider these assumptions when the 
cloud provider is trusted, untrusted (malicious provider), trusted cloud provider with 
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inside attacks or trusted provider but inquisitive. Figure 2.7 shows the possible roots 
attacks on the virtualized environment.  
 
Figure 2.7. Attacks roots in a virtualized environment (adopted from [18]) 
Below are the main attacks on the virtualized environment: 
1- Honest but curious provider (Semi-trustworthy): the curious providers may 
explore some data which not necessary to be shown for them. For example 
service providers of healthcare service, when the provider can collect the 
patient activity information, is not necessary to know the patient identity [5, 
106]. So, in this kind of threats the provider can read only and access the Admin 
Virtual machine [107].     
2- Malicious provider: Contrary to the previous threat, a malicious cloud 
provider can read and modify the administrator virtual machine status which 
reveals sensitive information and give access to the virtual machine monitor 
[18, 108, 109].  
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3- Admin VM: An administrator VM attacks may affect the virtual machine 
monitor over its management interface or the thin virtual machine directly. 
Therefore, such kind of attacks leads to lose the control on the virtualization 
system by interrupting the execution of the authorized VMs (affect availability) 
or modifying the VMs memory [18, 110]. 
4- VMM: The attacks from virtual machine monitor enable unauthorized access 
to the thin virtual machines status and produce several risks such as modifying 
the memory, processing the state of VMs, stop and running VMs, read sensitive 
data [111]. These attacks affect respectively the integrity, confidentiality and 
the availability of the victim VMs [18, 112].       
5-  Tenants cloud (costumers): migrating to the cloud solutions means the 
tenants are exposed to extra security risks due to the shared resources between 
them. So, a malicious tenant can attacks and get full access to the virtual 
machine [18, 113]. 
6- Guest virtual machine: a malicious guest virtual machine can get access to 
administrator virtual machines due to cross VM attacks or its vulnerabilities. 
The ports of Admin VM can be open only for Hypervisor’s virtual private 
network. Moreover, a guest virtual machine can attack and gain access to the 
VMM by exploiting its vulnerabilities as well [18, 114, 115]. Another 
virtualization threat can happen is when a malicious virtual machine attacks 
another virtual machine to retrieve sensitive data (co-residency attacks) [116].  
2.5 Related Security Techniques for Virtualization Challenges  
This section will provide the main proposed work by researchers to tackle the issues 
related to the virtualized environment in either cloud or mobile cloud computing:    
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1. Security-Aware Provisioning and Migration Scheme (SWAP)   
Researchers in [70] have proposed a security scheme called Security-aware 
Provisioning and Migration Scheme (SWAP) for provisioning and migrating thin 
virtual machine or phone clone for preventing the covert channel attacks. This kind of 
attack is a constructed link between VMs where the CPU cache and the memory bus 
are exploited to steal information from legitimate phone clones in a virtualized 
environment [17]. The proposed scheme includes two techniques. The first one is the 
provisioning of new phone clones where this technique works with mobile 
communication history to avoid users’ phone clones to host with other strangers' thin 
virtual machines. The second technique is responsible for migrating the phone clones 
from one host to another when the threats of attacks increase.  
The proposed solution has successfully kept little risks on phone clones compared with 
other proposed researchers algorithms. The performance gains of optimization 
allocation method that is similar when the cloud system has enough capacity to allocate 
phone clones in safety and avoiding risky allocation, but when the number of phone 
clones becomes larger, the proposed algorithm provides better migration mechanisms 
using optimal phone clones. The main shortcoming of the proposed approach is that 
researchers of this work are assumed that two phone clones in the same host do not 
attack each other when they have a link of communication between them. This work 
does not consider different scenarios (co-resident attacks, hypervisor attacks) which 
can happen and produce several security threats on phone clones. 
SWAP Algorithms: the issue is related on how to reduce the risks of the covert 
channel when cloud provider does not have enough resources to isolate the foreigner’s 
phones clones on the mobile cloud environment [70].  The authors have presented 
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three algorithms in this proposed schema. The first and second algorithm provides the 
steps to allocate the phones clones on the specifics host by implemented various 
condition. The algorithm based on the communication history between the mobile 
users when the virtual machines represent node and communication between virtual 
machines represent the edges (communication graph). Thus, both algorithms allocate 
the phone clones based on communication history between mobile users. The phone 
clones that have a communication link would not attack each other and may allocate 
in the same host.  
The third algorithm shows the migration steps of VMs users (phone clones). The 
migration means moving the phone clone from a host to another one in order to prevent 
the risks of retrieving the content of the phone clones from another adversary [70].  
2. Secure Mobile Cloud Platform (SMOC) 
Researchers in [34] have presented a platform called Secure Mobile Cloud Platform 
(SMOC) for securing the mobile cloud environment. The platform allows the user to 
run their applications whether on the cloud or on the mobile devices itself. In contrast, 
the proposed platform includes two concepts. The first one is sharing resource which 
means that a mobile application can freely change the running location for getting 
better user experience, not explicitly (obligatory) on the cloud. This design provides 
more flexibility compared to other proposed approaches and techniques. The second 
concept is ensuring security even though the operating system of the mobile device 
has been attacked. A thin virtual machine shares its information and files with the 
mobile device once the mobile application running in the cloud. Conversely, the 
mobile device shares its files and information (devices inputs/outputs) with VM-cloud 
for running the application.  
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Despite the benefits of this platform towards security concerns, there are many 
assumptions are not considered by the researchers such as untrusted hypervisor and 
untrusted public cloud provider. The proposed platform ensures the data security and 
privacy only when both assumptions (cloud provider and hypervisor) are assured. 
Thus, this platform ensures security towards the untrusted guest operating system 
which runs also unsecure applications. 
3. Providing User Security Guarantees in Public Infrastructure Clouds  
The authors of this work have proposed a framework for data and transaction security 
of infrastructure services [37]. The proposed framework contains various protocols for 
trust and the storage protection operation called Domain-Based Storage Protection 
(DBSP) and other protocols for trusting the virtual machines deployment called Trust-
Lunching (TL). Trust VMs made a more suitable method that the virtual machines are 
running inside a trusted host using secure computing techniques.  
The proposed work realized several security analyses against attacks and the obtained 
results improve the robustness and the efficiency of this framework. For more details, 
before the deployment of guest VMs, the protocol of trust VMs is performed. The 
second protocol is used cryptography techniques outside the IaaS domain for ensuring 
the data confidentiality stored in the cloud. Hence, authors have presented a list of 
malicious host attacks against IaaS environment to produce both secure protocols. The 
proposed framework can be integrated into the existing cloud platform due to 
numerous experiments and tests which have been realized on tenants’ sensitive data 
(e.g.: public healthcare patients’ data). However, this framework has been only 
considering specified attacks on IaaS platform which not guarantee for other security 
threats such as hypervisor attacks, co-resident attacks and so on.         
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4. An Approach to Defend Against Co-Resident Attacks in Cloud Computing  
Security is most prevalent in cloud services. Authors in [12] proposed an approach to 
minimize the co-resident attacks in a cloud environment. This work improved VM 
allocation policy, which makes difficulties for attackers to achieve their goals by 
preventing them to co-locate the unauthorized VMs with a legitimate one. It made up 
a new allocation policy security technique that includes workload balance and power 
consumption. Before this work, authors have proposed a PSSF tool (Previous Selected 
server first) [83] focusing on security problems like co-residency.  
The authors extended this tool with three policies: security, power consumption, and 
load balance to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the cloud platform 
environment. Moreover, they provide three security-based metrics (coverage, 
efficiency, and VMmin) in order to evaluate an allocation policy as safe or not. It 
applied several experiments on the simulation cloud platform CloudSim and the 
obtained results show remarkable robustness against co-resident attacks. However, the 
authors have only studied one type of attack: a co-resident attack occurred only inside 
one host and not distributed on different hosts. They also did not consider the migration 
attacks, which can make up large serious risks on VMs and increase the possibility of 
co-locating with VM victims.  
5. Hardware-Assisted Secure Virtual Machines (H-SVM) under a 
Vulnerable Hypervisor 
A new design for hardware based VM protection has proposed by [39]. The approach 
is called H-SVM, which is a Hardware-Assisted Secure Virtual Machine. The 
proposed mechanism protects the guest virtual machine for monitoring the malicious 
VM or hypervisor by isolating its memory virtualization. The authors have proposed 
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a new flexible and efficient mechanism of memory protection by allowing restricted 
roles for the hypervisors and decoupling the memory isolation from memory allocation 
that is usually executed by the hypervisor. Therefore, the handler (processor) takes 
some roles of hypervisor such as scheduling VMs. The mechanism of changing the 
hardware architecture presents drawbacks regarding the deployment cost and also 
maybe not suitable for immediate deployment.       
6. Security Isolation Approach for Virtual Machines Deployment 
Authors in [117] have proposed an approach for securing the VMs deployment. This 
approach reinforces the isolation among the virtual machines and controls the 
availability of resources by using a security system mechanism called the Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC). The use of the MAC controls the access of one process to 
another. They used the hypervisor which is running on the server operating system to 
secure the isolation of guest VMs. Also, they implemented a secure channel for 
migrating the VMs whenever the risks threat becomes higher. Despite the benefits of 
the solution proposed, authors have assumed that the hypervisor is trusted and other 
studies proved that several crucial attacks may come from the untrusted hypervisor. 
Therefore, the authors do not give an evaluation that makes their solution more 
understandable. 
7. Previously Selected Servers First (PSSF)  
The Previously Selected Servers First Policy is proposed by [83] namely as PSSF. The 
aim of this policy is to defend against co-resident attacks. However, the proposed 
algorithm lack of different security enhancement such as securing the mobile device 
VMs residing on it, live migration, securing the communication data between the VMs 
while located on mobile devices and the Cloud. The algorithm also lacking from 
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distributed application security algorithm deployed whether on mobile and cloud. 
Also, this algorithm targeting only the co-resident attacks and it does not target the 
other attacks like distributed VMs attacks communication, hypervisor attacks, and 
mobile device data attacks (Mobile Application). The hypervisor is responsible for 
isolating the VMs. Therefore, if the hypervisor is attacked successfully, the attacker 
can break down the isolation between VMs and the VMs will be retrieved by their 
data.   
8. Co-Location-Resistant Cloud (CLR) 
Authors in [30] have proposed a placement algorithm named Co-location resistant 
(CLR) which protects the VMs against two kinds of co-location attacks. The co-
location attacks are divided into two sub-attacks in the public cloud. The first attack is 
complete co-location whereas the adversary aims to co-locate with all users VMs. 
Otherwise, on the fractional attack which is the second kind of attack. The adversary 
targets some of VMs and not all VMs. The objective of this approach is to deploy the 
legitimate VMs in such a manner that Adversary VMs cannot co-locate with user VMs.  
The algorithm is targeting the optimization as well as the security aspects. However, 
it needs more improvement related to the isolation of the VMs once they executed in 
the cloud environment. Furthermore, the algorithm has not considered the risks when 
the VMs are communicating with each other and transferring the data which can affect 
the deployed task of application to be run correctly as well affect the integrity and 
confidentially of user data deployed on VMs. 
9. VMs Co-residency Attack (VCDS) 
Authors in [25] have presented a novel schema for detecting the VMs Co-residency 
attacks referred as VCDS. The covert side channel is a kind of attack when the isolation 
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between the VMs is broken which leads to steal sensitive information from the users. 
The schema is aimed to detect the VMs co-resident by getting the location of the 
particular VM. To clarify more, the simple way to know whether two VMs are on the 
host is to rely on network metrics by performing TCP Traceroute steps to get the IP 
address of Hypervisor. If two hypervisor IP addresses are the same that means 
corresponding VMs are on the same host (Co-resident). The advantage of this solution 
is increasing the difficulties to establish co-location. However, the attacker can use 
another technique and ways to steal information from legitimate user VMs. Thus, not 
a simple hiding of the IP address of hypervisor can be efficient to solve the co-
residency issues. 
10. Improving Cloud Survivability through Dependency based Virtual 
Machine Placement 
The authors have presented an approach of virtual machines placement on the cloud 
for defending against two types of attacks: co-resident attack and hypervisor attack 
[118]. The security of the VMs that sharing the same resources is depending not only 
on operating system and application they are running, but also the security of the 
virtual machines manager and VMs located on the same server. The approach employs 
Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) to analyze any security threats on VMs. The 
approach deal with security risks of VMs by migrating them periodically from a host 
to another one in order to find out a placement algorithm for safely prevent VMs from 
being retrieved. However, this kind of solution leads to extra power consumption and 
may reduce the performance of the service offered by the cloud provider for the clients, 




11. Dynamic Secure Interconnection (DSI) 
One novel mechanism was proposed by [119]  which solved the security of users' data 
being processed by the shared and virtualized platform on the cloud environment 
named Dynamic Secure Interconnection (DSI). DSI isolates the cloud environment 
into several trust virtual zones where the users can securely deploy their tasks. A 
virtual zone hosted various VMs together on the same costumer’s group in the cloud. 
As the VM is hosted using the same costumer’s group, the VM is considered trusted. 
This mechanism helps to protect the VM’s information security when VM migrating 
from one network to another. However, the migration solution causes extra bandwidth 
consumption overhead that degrades the service level agreement between a customer 
and a cloud service provider.  
12. Cloudradar: A real-time side-channel attack detection system in clouds 
The authors [120] have presented an approach called CloudRadar to detect and 
mitigate cache-side channels attacks in clouds in real time. The approach uses 
detection technique for co-resident VMs by verifying any abnormal behaviors while 
the VMs share caches. As it provides a reliable signature-based detection and 
continuous monitoring technique to identify the VMs that process cryptographic 
application. The proposed system achieved high accuracy detection with a lower 
performance overhead. However, it still limited as it does not cover other threats (e.g. 
VMs communications, hypervisor attacks and other side channels attacks), and often 
lacks of processing time integration on cloud applications.  
13. MIGRATE: Towards a Lightweight Moving-Target Defense Against 
Cloud Side-Channels 
In order to alleviate the co-location of VMs attacker on the same cloud server, [121] 
provide the users’ VMs live migration for the side channels attacks minimization on 
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virtualized environment. The proposed approach called MIGRATE, allows the 
lightweight migration of the tenants’ VMs. It faced challenges that raising the high 
infrastructure’s overheads by avoiding the full migration of the VMs. The mechanism 
evaluation showed a lower resource consumption compared to other VMs migration 
techniques. Nevertheless, VMs migration is not an efficient solution against side-
channel attacks due to the VM’s downtimes while moving from a host to another, 
which increase overhead challenges that may impact response time of users’ requested 
services from cloud provider.  
14. Cloud Aid: A Cloud Computing Tool for Mitigating Side-Channel Attacks 
Authors in [122] proposed a technique to mitigate the security threats of side attacks 
inside the cloud environment. A malicious VM can co-locate with legitimate users’ 
VM on the same host and generate side channel attacks inter-VMs for leaking and 
stealing the sharing of private information. The proposed technique is aiming to reduce 
the cache based side channels attack using a novel prevention tool called Cloud Aid. 
The tool has two-way protection. Firstly, it prevents the co-location of the tenants’ 
VMs with the attacker VMs before side-channel attacks. Secondly, it hides (encrypts) 
the data of the users that become much harder for an attacker to recover the sensitive 
data. The proposed work provides a secure approach without any VM migration 
techniques and ensures fewer infrastructures overhead. However, this approach still 
needs more validation in the real experiments. 
15. Secure and Efficient Enhanced Sharing of Data Over Cloud Using 
Attribute Based Encryption with Hash Functions 
Authors in [67] provide a cryptographic technique based on hash functions and 
asymmetric key encryption to protect the integrity and confidentiality of user data 
stored in the cloud. Performance evaluations of the encryption /decryption time and 
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key generation time are compared with other existing methods. The experiments 
showed that hash functions and asymmetric key encryption achieve better results than 
the existing Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) algorithms in terms of less encryption 
time, computing key time and decryption time. However, the proposed technique 
needs more real experiments to show the performance in preventing the attacks 
generated from virtualized environment. 
16. Hardware-Assisted Secure Resource Accounting under a Vulnerable 
Hypervisor 
Many research studies have shown that malicious tenants can circumvent the 
hypervisor and gain full control of the cloud platform. The hypervisor is responsible 
to allocate the resources for each user’s VMs that intend to leverage the server cloud 
resources like CPU, memory and cache. Many efforts have been invested in the users’ 
VMs protection against vulnerable hypervisor. The most prominent approach was 
proposed by [123] and utilizes hardware-based technique called Hardware Assisted 
Resource (HRA) for a secure cloud’s resources under an unprotected Virtual Machine 
Monitor (VMM). Although, their mechanism makes it difficult for cloud users to check 
out the memory and CPU allocation size in which malevolent users perfectly steal 
resources. The unprotected hypervisor can arbitrarily allocate a huge amount of 
resources to malicious VMs, which affect the resources availability, and it will then 
decrease the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the tenants and cloud providers. 
2.6 Comparative study of related works  
All of the above-described related works provide mechanisms for dealing with some  
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common attacks and computation complexity of data security and privacy on the 
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From the above table, it can be clearly seen that previous research works have many 
limitations regarding several reasons. The first reason, such proposed solutions lack a 
mechanism that ensures the communication between VMs located on different servers. 
To clarify, researchers in  [83] have done a great idea whereby provided two metrics 
for measuring the attacks, but they do not consider the issues on data interaction 
between the VMs that attackers can violate while they communicate. The second 
reason, some solutions assume that hypervisor is always protected unless the attacker 
can get control of the hypervisor, which directly controls the whole VMs. Finally, other 
solutions provided security for phone clones on the cloud side, but not on mobile 
devices.   
2.7 Related Cloud Tools and Comparative Study  
There are various simulators for both cloud computing and MCC that attracted 
researchers to utilize their potential capabilities in different research issues such as 
load balancing, power consumption, offloading, security and privacy issues. Table 2.2 
shows a comparison between the most popular cloud simulators selecting the right 
simulator tool is very necessary to evaluate the research project. These are the most 
popular simulators include CloudSim, GreenCloud, ICanCloud, GroudSIM, 
NetworkCloudSim, secCloudSim and so on. Thus, a critical study is carried out in this 
section in order to know the advantages and weaknesses of these simulators. 
1. CloudSim 
CloudSim is a simulator toolkit that provides modeling and simulation of the cloud 
environment and its resources [124]. Figure 2.8 shows the CloudSim package 
integrated with Eclipse Java IDE. CloudSim is able of simulating the variety cloud 
component such as data centers, hosts, users, virtual machines, service brokers and 
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cloudlet, also different policies proposed by researchers like virtual machine allocation 
policies, outsourcing policies and scheduling. All the resources implemented as a Java 
class examples that easily requested an object to help researchers to deal with different 
requirements. The users can make different type of research work including the 
development of new policies, editing the existing one, implementing mechanism and 
approach and make several tests under different scenarios before trying on the real 
systems. The CloudSim simulator is widely used by researchers and organizations 
such as HP labs in USA. It demonstrates its success by conducting numerous case 
studies with it. However, the major disadvantage of this tool is the absence of the 
graphical panel. 
 
Figure 2.8. CloudSim Package Integrated Eclipse  
CloudSim Architecture: CloudSim has been designed to support the modeling and 
simulation in terms of providing management for cloud virtualization (VMs), storage, 
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bandwidth, and memory. Figure 2.9 shows the CloudSim architecture with a different 
layer that contains multiple modules. The CloudSim previously has used a discrete 
event simulation engine, namely SimJava [125] which is illustrated on the lowest level 
of CloudSim architecture. This layer includes many functionalities that needed by the 
higher simulation level to create and process operations and events, manage and update 
the cloud entities (data centers, host, virtual machine, services, broker), 
communication between component [124]. Currently, the SimJava is removed due to 
the incapability of supporting such advanced operations. Next, GridSim layer presents 
functionalities of GridSim for modeling and simulating various Grid Infrastructure and 
its resources, also creating networks and the traffic profiles. All these functionalities 
have extended by the CloudSim to support extra modeling systems of cloud computing 
[126]. The SimJava and GridSim layers are encapsulated in the CloudSim core 









Figure 2.9.  CloudSim architecture 
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The upper CloudSim layer consists of many units which contain several components 
such as virtual machines management services, cloud services, and resources. In this 
layer, thousands of cloud computing instantiation entities (VMs, host, application, and 
datacenters) can be managed and executed concurrently and transparently during the 
simulation step. Moreover, this layer enables to tackle other main issues related 
provisioning host to VMs depending on user requirements, dynamic monitoring and 
control the application execution. In our research, we need to programmatically extend 
the virtual machine allocation policies and other resources and policies to implement 
our research work approach. The top layer in this CloudSim architecture is the User 
Code. In this layer, the configuration for the host is established by determining the 
number of machines and their characteristics, also the configuration of applications by 
specifying the number of tasks and their requirements, number of user and application 
types, likewise other configurations related to scheduling policies. 
2. Green Cloud 
Datacenters are considered as the main components that provisioning the computing 
resources for tenants in cloud computing environment. Many research works reveal 
that communication between components on the datacenters and the computing units 
(Servers, VMs, and Switches) consume a high-energy cost. In order to come up with 
a new optimized energy aware schema from researchers. Green Cloud simulator [127] 
is destined for such issue of energy awareness of datacenters. The disadvantage of the 
Green Cloud is its TCP/IP implementing in the datacenter network, which requires 
high memory requirement and large simulation time. Green cloud scales well when 




Figure 2.10. Green Cloud architecture 
3. iCanCloud 
Using simulation tools are considered as the best analysis approach to prevent the 
spending of cost (time, money) when studying and verifying different complex 
scenarios. This permit to develop and to evaluate the performance of any proposed 
approach in repeatable and control manner. iCanCloud is a simulation platform allows 
the simulation of various experiments of scientific researchers especially on the cloud 
brokering policies of virtual machines [128]. The simulator is concentrated on the 
Amazon cloud provider to do experiments in such platform. iCanCloud can simulate 
large experiments with either 32 bit or 64 bits systems because is written with C++ 
language compared to CloudSim that is created with Java language, which affects 
negatively the 32 bits systems design. The iCanCloud can use all the memory available 
on the hosts while running the experiments (i.e.: for 64 and 32 bits physical machines). 
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More advantage of iCanCloud is the graphic interface that helps researchers to create 
experiments and scenarios easily. The ability of iCanCloud to run parallel simulations, 
so one experiment can use different machines. CloudSim, MDCSim and GreenCloud 
do not support this point. Figure 2.11 illustares iCanCloud architecture. 
 
Figure 2.11. iCanCloud architecture 
4. GroudSim 
Due to the process based approach that executes each separate thread in host machine 
and the lack of the high scalability of the existing simulators such as CloudSim and 
GridSim. A GroudSim is proposed to support the large scientific applications either on 
the Grid or cloud systems.  GroudSim is an event-based simulator, which only requires 
one simulation thread [129]. GroudSim is able to support complex simulation 
scenarios such as calculation of costs. The focus of GroudSim is the infrastructure as 
a service (IaaS). GroudSim consists of SimEngine for specifying the time-advance 
algorithm and the event lists. GroudSim is developed in Java environment. One of the 





Previous simulators such as CloudSim consider the datacenters as a collection of 
virtual machines, which allow only the modeling of simple applications models. That 
affect the results by obtaining both inaccurate and non-realistic solutions. 
NetworkCloudSim is a simulator tool that permits to model realistic application such 
as message passing applications (MPI) that requires tasks communication and sharing 
data between each other [130]. This tool allows the modeling of the various network 
topologies on the Cloud Computing environment. NetwrorkCloudSim is the tool that 
we choose to simulate and evaluate our proposed approach. More details about 
NetworkCloudSim simulator are in chapter three. 
6. secCloudSim 
There is a strong need to develop security cloud simulators that provide opportunities 
to simulate the security experiments of different researchers' policies and approaches. 
Therefore, it is worth mentioning secCloudSim [131]. The latter, is an extended secure 
layer designed and implemented on the top of iCanCloud Simulator.  secCloudSim is 
considered the only new secure cloud simulator among other simulators which are all 
not supporting the security, confidentiality and privacy aspect. The new simulator 
provides the users with the basis security characteristics of authorization and 
authentication in the cloud environment. However, secCloudSim has only focused on 
basic features such as authentication and authorization modules. Further, the 
secCloudSim is not able to model and simulate complex distributed applications 
because the backbone of it based on the iCanCloud simulator. Figure 2.12 shows the 




Figure 2.12. secCloudSim architecture 

























Table 2.2  







CloudSim [124] Open Source, Java Ability to model and 
simulate the cloud 







-Not support the 
modeling of parallel 
applications 
(communication Tasks) 
-Inaccurate results of 
complex applications 
evaluation 
- Not support security 
aspect 
Green Cloud [127]  Open Source, C++ 
and  OTcl 
High capability of 
modeling and 
simulation of Energy 




affect the results due to 
the TCP/IP model and 
simulation execution 





requirement and large 
simulation time 
- Not support security 
aspect  







-Using two different 
language C++ and OTcl 
to implement one single 
experiment 










Table 2.2 continued 





and the event lists) 
either in Greed or 
Cloud environment  
The focus of GroudSim 
is the infrastructure as a 
service (IaaS) and no 
other services such as 
SaaS and PaaS 




Open Source, Java Ability to model and 
simulate the realistic 
distributed 
applications with 
communicating tasks  




-Modeling of the 
various network 
topologies on the 
Cloud Computing 
environment 
- Not support security 
aspect 
secCloudSim [131] Open Source, C++ -Give the 
opportinuty for 
cloud users to work 
on designing secure 
cloud simulator as a 
new resarch 
direction.  
-Allow cloud users 
to simulate their 
secure polices with 
the basis security 
characteristics of 
authorization and 
authentication in the 
cloud. 
- Not support the to 
model and simulate 
complex distributed 
applications because the 
backbone of it based on 
the iCanCloud simulator 
- secCloudSim does not 
implement other 
security features such as 
Encryption and 
decryption of users’ 
data which preserve : 
the integrity and privacy 
of the virtual machines. 
As welll, secure VM 
allocation polices and 
other attacks like : co-
resident and hypervsior 
attacks.  
 
From the table above and except the case of NetworkCloudSim simulator. All the 
simulators are not able to model and simulate complex distributed applications with 
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communicating tasks aspect on the cloud environment. Indeed, the results of the 
evaluation of any mechanism and policy will not be accurate as the researchers need. 
Furthermore, the Majority of cloud simulators do not focus on security issues 
especially the security of users’ sensitive data in either mobile or cloud environment 
unless secCloudSim. For that reason, we motivated to create a secure cloud simulator 
in order to help researchers to evaluate their security approach and policies. Chapter 5 
illustrates our added security layers on NetworkCloudSim which make it able to 
simulate security experiments or research secure scenarios that faced cloud 
community.  
2.8 Diffie–Hellman and Hash on Encrypted Key Exchange 
This section details Diffie-Hellman’s algorithm and its main involved steps as well as 
the Hash algorithms. The important reasons for using them in this research work 
compared to existing techniques are also presented.  
2.8.1 Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm is a digital encryption method to securely exchanging 
cryptographic keys between two entities that willing to communicate sensitive data 
between them [61, 132, 133]. This method allows a secure channel between two 
entities that have no prior recognition of each other over an unsecured and public 
channel. Diffie-Hellman method involves the use of mathematical functions from both 
parties in order to get a common value which considers as a secret key that known only 
from those parties [134, 135]. 
Let’s assume that there are two parties A and B intend to communicate over unsecured 
communication channel. We assume that A is VM1 and B is VM2 or A is User and B 
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is Secure Cloud Proxy. There is another party C (Attacker) eavesdropping A and B in 
order to get the data shared between them. 
When A encrypts the message that intends to send to B. It must also send the key to 
decrypt this message (Secret Decryption Key). The attacker can get the encrypted 
message as well as the key to decrypt this message while A sends to B. Diffie-Hellman 
provides the solution for this situation as follow:  
First, A sends a public key to B, and B also sends a public Key to A. The Attacker C 
cannot see the public and private keys of both A and B. Second, A and B agree on two 
numbers: one prime number and generator number. Using the signature generator, the 
private key of A and B can be constructed.  The attacker or any third party cannot find 
these two numbers. 
In order to ensure security and privacy, first of all, the users A and B willing to 
exchange information, need to generate a pair of public and private keys. The public 
keys have to be exchanged before. Both public keys of A and B are generated using 
the following equation:  
Public key = Generator private key mod Prime                        (2.1) 
After A and B exchanges their public keys. They can calculate the secret key by using 
the following equations: 
Secret key A = Public key B private key A mod Prime              (2.2) 
Secret key B = Public key A private key B mod Prime              (2.3) 
They find the same result once the secret keys have been constructed, the same results 
can be founded (secret key A = secret key B). However, C cannot find the same result 
because it difficult to get the private number of A and B. More particularly if it is a big 
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integer. Moreover, C will find a mathematical problem called Discrete Logarithm 
problem [61]. For example, it is easy to calculate: 315 mod 17 = 6 but it is very difficult 
to calculate 3? Mod 17 = 6. Especially when the private number is longer than 100. 
Therefore, the calculation will be computationally unsolvable. This secret key can use 
it with any encryption method. 
A comparison between the Hash Diffie-Hellman technique and other encryption 
techniques will be more elaborated in chapter 6. 
2.8.2 Hash algorithms 
The hash function is one of the most powerful cryptographic tools that preserves data 
integrity transmitted over the unsecured public network [136, 137, 138]. There are 
many hashing algorithms such as MD5, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, 
SHA384, and SHA512. Otherwise, in encryption algorithms, there are AES, DES, 
RSA, Rot13, RC4, and XOR.  Both hash and encryption algorithms encrypt the 
message to a ciphertext (encrypted message). However, in hashing, whatever the size 
of the message that intends to hash, the result given is a fixed size. For example in 
MD5 hash function, the resulting hash is 32 hexadecimal characters (fixed size) 
whatever the size of the message [139, 140]. 
In hashing, there is no need for a key to make the hashing process. The main objective 
of the hash function is guaranteeing the invisibility of the hash ciphertext, which can 
be seen only by the party which hash it (data integrity protection). If any party wants 
to know the original value of hash cipher text, it needs to give the right plaintext.   
Using the example of cloud proxy, the user sends the right plaintext to the trusted cloud 
proxy, the proxy hashes the plaintext and checks the existing hash codes, if the value 
of the ciphertext matches any other ciphertext, the proxy then provides authorized 
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access for the user in order to leverage its cloud services. If there is any change on 
hash ciphertext, that means that user data integrity has been modified or retrieved while 
it transmitted over the network from any attackers. 
In this research, we adopted SHA256 function hash, which gives a ciphertext of 64 
characters. In the encryption method, the message that being sent, is encrypted with a 
random key. In such method, the change of the plaintext gives unfixed size of 
ciphertext. Moreover, if the character changes, for example: “hello” and “Hello”, the 
ciphertext will be the same value. However, in hashing, if character changes, so the 
value of ciphertext will be changed as well. 
2.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented the concepts related to mobile cloud computing and 
security issues. First, it defined main concepts for MCC including MCC services, 
offloading technique, security and privacy issues, virtualization and the most popular 
attacks on virtualized systems. Then, current security cloud virtualization based 
mechanisms, virtualization hypervisor model; encrypted and VM allocation policy 
techniques were reviewed and strategically analyzed for the protection of VM 
information and significance. Furthermore, it introduced some of the recent related 
mechanisms to workload balancing and energy consumption in MCC. Based on our 
literature review analysis, this research studies the issues that related to the security 
and privacy of the virtual machines sensitive data and information in terms of VMs 
co-location attacks in the same host or on different hosts to achieve high security level 
and on both cloud and mobile parts for deploying and implementing their security 
techniques. In the next chapter, the research methodology for achieving the objectives 





3.1 Introduction  
Currently, securing the sensitive data of distributed mobile applications that transit 
over cloud communication gateways is crucial. However, it has become easier for a 
third party to intercept and alter these data. The main objective of this research work 
is to come up with an approach that enhances the security of the user’s sensitive data 
on the Mobile Cloud Computing environment (MCC) deployed on thin virtual 
machines from being retrieved and lost for another malicious user. The proposed 
approach contributes to protecting sensitive data shared among distributed mobile 
applications against different common attacks on virtualization layer such as co-
resident attacks, hypervisor attacks and distributed attacks. Three well-known security 
policies are included in this approach that ensures the sensitive data safety via 
protected distributed mobile applications to be intercepted and altered while 
communicate which each other, which lead to achieving a high-security level on the 
mobile cloud computing environment.  
This chapter presents the main steps that will be used to achieve the research 
objectives. An efficient and robust methodology is required to accomplish the research 
objectives presented in chapter one.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 details the research 
methodology which contains research phases, conceptual model and the development 
approach process. Section 3.3 details the proposed approach’s policies. Section 3.4 
presents the different techniques of performance evaluation and its evaluation 
environment. Furthermore, we define the security metrics to evaluate the performance 
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of the secure cloud proxy and its related policies. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter.  
3.2 Research Framework 
In order to enhance the security level for sharing sensitive data in MCC and managing 
distributed VMs in a high abstraction level, we propose research approach consists of 
combination of three well-known security-based policies (i.e., co-resident attacks, 
hypervisor attacks, and distributed attacks) with a new security proxy-based approach 
for modeling the privacy level of sensitive data exchanged between different 
distributed mobile applications while the cloud is used for sharing computing 
resources and its ability to manage VMs efficiently. This approach aims to enhance a 
distributed mobile application to be more robust and to cover a maximum protection 
space against thin virtual machines’ attacks that occurred inside and between different 
cloud hosts. Our approach is dedicated to securing VMs over fraudulent exchanges on 
sensitive data. Fraudulent exchanges can occur due to unauthorized VMs that aspire 
to share and to access the data through the cloud host or the communication gateway. 
These attacks are exactly performed while leveraging the virtualization techniques. 
The approach will also aim for reducing the cost in terms of security management time 
and computation complexity (i.e. proxy-based as a principal gate), as another benefit 
that makes the solution more practical and desired for the current cloud platforms. For 
achieving these objectives, a well and accurate understanding of the existing solutions 
is required to get a better enhancement and best outcome [141]. 
Our commitment to achieving the objectives set in Chapter One. The research follows 
the basic approach’s stages as depicted in Figure 3.1. At the beginning of the research 
work, a taxonomy of security in MCC environment and mechanisms are examined 
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which represents some solutions for solving such related problem in order to obtain a 
research plan.    
 
Figure 3.1 Research Design 
Secondly, we studied the literature review of the proposed solutions and their 
algorithms to solve the security problem on the virtualization layer in both CC and 
mobile cloud in order to identify the strength of each one. Then, a conceptual model 
is provided and generated after examining step one and two. For the simulation, 
NetworkCloudSim simulator will be used in order to achieve the main objective of this 
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research work. Finally, much experimentation will be conducted as a final step to 
evaluate and validate the performance of the proposed approach. 
3.2.1 Research Phases 
This research work consists of multiple research steps in order to realize the main 
objectives mentioned in Chapter I:  
1. A comprehensive literature review about the security in MCC in general 
and the existing solutions for virtualization security attacks. 
2. Design a mobile user control access for preventing the unauthorized 
access of malevolent users to the cloud provider services.  
3. Design secure VM allocation policies consist of securing the different 
type of users’ VMs allocation and ensure the protection of the 
Hypervisor security by defending the VMs from any attack that intends 
to retrieve sensitive insider data. 
4. Design a software VMs communication policy based on the proxy in 
order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of sensitive data 
exchanged among VMs.  
5. Extend NetworkCloudSim simulator in order to enable simulating 
security scenarios of distributed intensive applications that use 
virtualization-based techniques for processing on cloud environment 
and getting real and accurate simulation results.  
6. Evaluating the proposed approach in a mobile cloud environment in 
terms of the effectiveness of defending against the different stated 
attacks, also evaluating the approach in terms of cost: security 
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management time and computation complexity through simulations 
experiments.      
3.2.2 Conceptual Model 
In order to make the MCC more attractive by mobile users, it is compulsory to provide 
the best services that users can be confident once using them. One of the main aspects 
that hesitate the costumers to engage in this technology is security issues especially 
when they move out their sensitive information to the cloud infrastructure using the 
virtualization technique. Therefore, the increasing need for an effective and efficient 
approach that can cover the maximum threats and risks which can occur for the 
legitimate VMs becomes a major concern. This is very helpful to answer the required 
protection of the user sensitive-data from being stolen whether is hosted on the same 
and different hosts on the cloud.  
The efficient and robust approach for protecting and maintaining the user sensitive-
data over malicious attacks has led to a trade-off between costs (e.g., fast security 
management time, low computation complexity) and improved security level. In order 
to meet these requirements, this research aims to propose an effective approach based 
on two security policies (objective one and two) and one technique (objective three) 
that guarantee information privacy and confidentiality against different attacks that 
performed on VMs. We mainly focus on the suited mechanisms for distributed mobile 
applications that use virtualization techniques and share sensitive data to leverage 
cloud services and resources.  
The protection of sensitive data in the distributed mobile application becomes a major 
issue, and it involves a wide range of several activities from various actors with distinct 
sites exchange a vast amount of data, which makes the security of such data very 
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costly. Therefore, sensitive data may be the target of malicious attacks due to the lack 
of privacy and confidentiality checking. Unauthorized access to such sensitive data 
can cause many problems such as privacy violation. For achieving the main objective, 
two policies and one technique are included: 
1- Design a client control access and secure VM allocation policies on the 
different hosts in the cloud. 
2- Design a hybrid-policy consist of VM allocation policy and Hypervisor policy 
in order to ensure the data VMs from being retrieved in order to guarantee the 
thin VM integrity and hypervisor integrity.    
3- To develop a proxy-based security technique on the cloud in order to protect 
the transferring of sensitive data between VMs.  
A conceptual model for the research has been elaborated and described in Figure 3.2.    
 
Figure 3.2. Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model of the research work contains five main steps. The first step is 
responsible for defining the identity of remote client site and check that the non-
76 
 
vulnerability and the eligibility of access are verified. Then, analyzing the mobile 
client requests and check if the security for VM allocation of distributed sensitive 
applications (e.g. critical banking intensive application and mobile health application) 
is authorized by the cloud provider. The second step is responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating the security policies of the proposed approach in terms of pre-known 
metrics (i.e. coverage and efficiency of attacks) related to the number of target VMs 
and input/outputs sensitive communication getaways. The third step is responsible for 
controlling and filtering the potential attacked host for VMs and restricted channels 
that transfer data from the mobile to the Cloud (also between VMs) which means 
reduce the number of externally available hosts and also reduce the time and the cost 
benefits from exploiting a computing resource. This step aims to enhance the security 
level for sharing security analysis results using the Share Secure Result component to 
the proxy.  It is responsible for providing security directives to the policies proposed 
on the approach. Finally, the last step is called Re-allocation of VMs that update the 










































































The work of [83] is extended and adapted for distributed mobile applications in order 
to decrease the coverage and efficiency attack while reducing the attacked rate and the 
security management time. We integrate VMs secure interaction among various VMs 
deployed on different hosts along three security policies: input and output interfaces, 
hypervisor, and untrusted sensitive data using security-based proxy. Furthermore, 
benchmark data is used in order to validate our work.      
3.2.3 Development of the Proposed Approach  
This section aims to answer the research questions of the research work and ending 
with a mechanism or developed approach. Many processes in the design must be 
repeated to get a complete approach or mechanism. Figure 3.4 shows the development 
process of our proposed research work. 
 
Figure 3.4. Development Approach Process 
The development approach process is containing four main models, namely Model 
Specification, Model Development, Model Implementation, and Model Assembling 
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and Testing. The first model is called Model Specification, aiming to determine the 
different policies integrate inside that the proposed security approach. The model 
development is considered as a complex step to achieve a realistic and final design 
because of many sub-processes that can be added and removed from it in the way of 
the research. The third model is named Model Implementation responsible for 
managing and refining the functions included in the research approach. Determining, 
implementing and checking the different parts of the policies are required for the 
research. The last model is called assembling and testing model. This model aims to 
assemble all parts on one complete unit, also testing the policies and validate them in 
order to achieve the main objective of this research work.    
The main deliverables of the Perspective Study are: 
 Chapter four and five (Objective one, two, three and four) 
 Various research papers 
 Design, implementation of the proposed approach 
 Validation of the proposed approach   
3.2.3.1 Implementation and Validation of the Development Process 
The proposed approach consists of several parts. Each part provided a function to a 
specific target. These functions are implemented using Java programing language on 
the whole research work.  Moreover, for ensuring that every single mechanism works 
correctly, code should be clean from any bugs and errors [142]. To realize that, Eclipse 
Java Development Tool (JDT) is the programming platform that will be used to 
achieve the objectives. Eclipse IDE supports the edition, compilation and generating 
executable files, also making the development process easier. Figure 3.5 shows the 
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Eclipse IDE with bugs and errors’ panel for verifying that the mechanisms have written 









Figure 3.5. Java Eclipse IDE  
For the validation model of this research work, the complete development process is 
presented below in three main consecutive steps (see Figure 3.7). We integrate the 
validation model in which researchers met their intended requirement in terms of 
policies included and the accuracy of test results [143]. All the parts and constraints 
are described in Figure 3.5 to satisfy elaborated requirements for main objective and 
sub-objectives.       
3.3 Policies-Based Security Approach  
The research approach proposed in this thesis contains three secure policies. Each 




3.3.1 Mobile User Control Access Policy 
Firstly, before mobile user access to service cloud provider for deploying their 
requested tasks, they authenticate by entering identifier and password. The secure 
proxy checks if the mobile user has access or no (control access requirement). If a user 
exists in a Black List then return access denied. Else, the proxy has a User 
Authentication Table includes all the users that have access to the cloud service. 
In the case of the user provides correct identifier and password (e.g. exists on the User 
Authentication Table), so the proxy calls hypervisor to allocate VM in any available 
host (server side). Elsewhere, the proxy increases the probability of unauthorized 
access and the user re-enter the identifier and the password. When the probability of 
unauthorized access becomes greater than a given threshold, the proxy detects the 
malicious mobile user, updates the blacklist table and return access denied. After that, 
the mobile device that gets access will classify on User Trust Level Table as fully trust 
mobile device.  
The secure proxy classifies in the green level, the mobile device that provides true 
identifier and password. Figure 3.6 shows the secure mobile user control access policy 









Enter the user identifier and the user password 
If secure proxy finds a user exists in a blacklist  then  
    Deny the status of the user  
else 
while (the user identifier and the user password  are not existing) 
 Increase the probability of unauthorized access  
     If the probability of unauthorized access greater than probability threshold then   
        Insert the user in a blacklist  and deny the status of the user 
    else 
        Enter the user identifier and the user password and check again 
 End while 
 Authorized the status of the user 
 The user’s virtual machine is allocated in the cloud host 
 Give the user full authorization access (i.e. green trust level)  
 
Figure 3.6. Secure Mobile User Control Access Policy 
3.3.2 Hypervisor Policy 
The secure proxy classifies in the green level, the mobile device that provides the true 
secure keys. Otherwise, degrade mobile device to a lower level (orange or red) depends 
on the probability of unauthorized access session. As a result, the mobile devices that 
have level 3 (red statue) will be directly assigned to another table named as Black List 
Table and it will be denied access session. So, the proxy notifies the hypervisor of 
malicious detection and sends the order to the hypervisor to un-deploy all VMs and 
communication channel of the mobile device. Figure 3.7 shows the secure hypervisor 









     Ask the user identifier and their secret key of the current session 
     If secure proxy finds the user identifier and their secret key are correct then 
          A new virtual machine is allocated in the cloud host; 
     else 
      Increase the probability of unauthorized access session;  
     If the probability of unauthorized access session greater than the first probability threshold then 
          Set the user in a  medium authorization access category (i.e., orange trust level);                    
     If the probability of unauthorized access session greater than the second probability threshold 
then 
          Set the user in a third authorization access level (i.e., red trust level);       
      If the probability of unauthorized access session greater than the third probability threshold then 
          Insert the user in a blacklist and deny the status of the user; 
Until (the status  of the user is denied or out of sessions time) 
 If the status is denied then 
     Send notification to the hypervisor  
     Stopped  all the user VM’s machines 
     Stopped  all communication channels of each VM’s machines of the user  
     Send notifications to other mobile users  
 EndIf 
  
Figure 3.7. Secure Hypervisor Policy   
3.3.3 VMs communication Policy 
When a given VM demand to establish a communication channel with another VM. 
The target VM asks the source VM to provide VM secret keys. In the same time when 
sending the data, the target VM continues to send its secret keys to the source VM. 
Otherwise, degrade VM to a lower level (orange or red) depends on the probability of 
unauthorized communication. As a result, the VM that has level 3 (red statue) will be 
directly assigned to another table named as Local Black List Table and make access 
communication denied. So, the VM notifies the hypervisor to malicious VM detection, 
and so on to Proxy and increase the probability of unauthorized access.  
If a probability of unauthorized access exceeds the probability threshold, then the 
proxy sends the order to the hypervisor to undeploy all VMs and communication 
channel of the mobile device. Figure 3.8 presents the secure virtual machines 




     Ask the target virtual machine identifier and its communication key 
     If secure proxy finds the virtual machine identifier and its communication key are correct then 
          Establish a new communication channel among VMs and start providing data 
    else 
      Increase the probability of unauthorized communication;  
     If the probability of unauthorized communication greater than the first probability threshold then 
         Set the VM in a  medium authorization access category (i.e., orange trust level);                    
    If the probability of unauthorized communication greater than the second probability threshold 
then  
         Set the VM in a  low authorization access category (i.e., red trust level);  
    If the probability of unauthorized communication greater than the third probability threshold 
then  
         Insert VM in a blacklist  and deny the access communication 
 Until (the status  of the user is denied or out of communication) 
If access session denied then 
     Send notification to the proxy module  
     Stopped  all communication channels of the target VM  
     Increase the probability of unauthorized access  
      If probability of unauthorized access greater than probability threshold then 
         Insert the VM target in a black list and deny the status of communication channel 
     EndIf 
 EndIf 
 
Figure 3.8. Secure VMs Communication Policy   
3.4 Performance Evaluation 
The DS-II stage focuses on the evaluation part of the designed mechanisms and 
approach. For any research, the evaluation plays a crucial role to evaluate the work 
proposed in terms of performance and effectiveness. Three methods named as 
analytical modeling, simulation and measurements have proposed by [144] to evaluate 
the approach performance.  
3.4.1 Different techniques of performance evaluation 
It is very important to determine the evaluation performance technique for any research 
work [144]. Table 3.1 shows the comparison between methods of research, evaluation 
and describes the characteristic of each technique. 
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Table 3.1  
Comparison of Performance Evaluation Techniques ( Adopted from [144] ) 
 
 
3.4.1.1 Analytical model 
An analytical model is mathematical modeling that uses many mathematic equations 
to analyze and evaluate the performance of the system [145].  The mathematical model 
is analyzed using programming software, which interprets the operations by availing 
the working relationships within the system. The outcomes of the software program 
can be presented by using graphical representation or symbolization. The users are 
able to regulate the system’s conditions by changing the parameters of the software. 
This technique is preferably used in the case of study is unsafe or rare in real life, 
which leads to better understanding the primary result of the system before 
implementing the program. From Table 3.1, the Analytical Model technique has 
disadvantage related to low accuracy. However, it has many benefits regarding the low 
cost, easy in trade-off evaluation and less time required compared to simulation and 




3.4.1.2 Measurement  
Measurement is a performance evaluation technique that uses an implementation or 
test-beds to conduct any research project such as network, cloud. This approach has a 
disadvantage in term of high cost due to the real equipment needed [139, 137]. 
Moreover, most of the measurements are habitually not repeatable and generally 
studying little scenarios. For instance, in cloud computing, many commercial IT 
organizations have launched real testbeds such as Amazon EC2/S3, PlanetLab, 
EmuLab, IBM/Google cluster to conduct a real cloud project. However, these test-
beds are only supported such aspects of distributed computing and are not open source 
for general researchers [147].     
3.4.1.3 Simulation 
From Table 3.1, it is clear that simulation is a suitable method for the performance 
evaluation of the research work. Simulation is the method that commonly used for 
dealing with the various models of the real system using such software of simulation 
to emulate the programs’ characteristic and operations. Furthermore, many reasons 
have been taken into account for preferring the simulation in terms of repeatable, 
scalable and controllable environment. The simulation allows the researchers to do 
repeatable experiments to get the highest accuracy level of the performance demanded 
[148]. In this research, the simulation method is selected to evaluate and measure the 
performance of the proposed approach. 
3.4.2 Evaluation Environment   
In our work, we are going to evaluate the security and privacy of users’ data while is 
interacted or deployed in virtual machines for processing in MCC environment. The 
specific elements of our study are the integrity and confidentiality of user sensitive 
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data. The integrity means that unauthorized VM cannot modify the mobile user’s data 
deployed on thin virtual machines. Moreover, confidentially means the encryption and 
decryption of users ‘sensitive data. So, the work is specifically concentrated on the 
integrity of mobile users’ data and the encryption/decryption of session keys. 
3.4.2.1 NetworkCloudSim 
Cloud computing is an advanced technology that provides services to the end-users in 
pay as you use manner. The application services have many requirements that need to 
manage such as configuration, complex provisioning policies, and deployment while 
they located on the cloud computing infrastructure. The performance, evaluating of 
such allocation and provisioning policies, power consumption model, workload model 
in a repetitive way is considered as very difficult task especially under different types 
of system and user configuration. 
NetworkCloudSim is able to model distributed application with communication aspect 
while the datacenters process tasks. Mainly, the NetworkCloudSim considers all tasks 
as first-class entities called network cloudlets integrates both computation and 
communication.  NetworkCloudSim is an extended layer of the CloudSim simulator 
which provides the network between datacenters but not inside them. In CloudSim, 
each VM connected to other VM without any details, but in NetworkCloudSim, a VM 
is connected to other VMs by switches: root, aggregate, and edge which give a real 
network model inside the datacenter. Figure 3.9 shows NetworkCloudSim Package 














Figure 3.9. NetworkCloudSim Package Integrated Eclipse  
3.4.2.2 NetworkCloudSim Architecture 
We have chosen NetworkCloudSim because of its ability to codify the behavior of any 
complex cloud system with an ordered sequence of various events in time. This is what 
it calls a discrete event simulation. Moreover, it has many features that made us 
develop our simulation environment on top of it. In this section, we describe the 
functionality of various NetworkCloudSim layers. Figure 3.10 shows 


















Figure 3.10. NetworkCloudSim Architecture  
The NetworkCloudSim is created based on CloudSim architecture. Some elements are 
added (dark boxes) to enable simulating applications with communicating tasks 
deployed on the cloud environment. The bottom layer of CloudSim treats the 
interaction and communication between the CloudSim elements and entities. The 
second layer is consisting of many sub-layers model the main components of the cloud 
computing such as datacenters, servers and other cloud resources that help to design 
infrastructure as cloud service. VM services and cloud services allow designing virtual 
machines provisioning and scheduling policies. The top layer permits cloud users to 




NetworkCloudSim has incorporated many components, which make the users model 
very complex many tiers applications that need more than one processor with internal 
network resources within datacenters in order to simulate realistic scenarios compared 
to modest modeling of CloudSim simulator. Those components are focusing on 
realizing two main issues: Application models and network models.  
For the applications models, NeworkCloudlet class added to CloudSim to provide 
users with communicating tasks aspect to model their applications. Each 
NeworkCloudlet consists of Tasks processing in different stages of computation and 
communication. Another class added called AppCLoudlet that represents a several 
communicating NeworkCloudlet instance where each instance run in a specific virtual 
machine with communication and computing phases. 
For the network models, NetworkCloudSim enables to model realistic network 
topologies inside the datacenters, not only between datacenters like the CloudSim. 
Many applications exchange data through the network may affected by data latency, 
which negatively reduces the quality of service delivered to the cloud users. Network 
CloudSim allows modeling data latency and bandwidth to analyze the performance of 
any applications. Switch, HostPacket and NetworkPacket are the main classes added 
by NetworkCloudSim. 
3.4.3 Performance Metrics  
Performance metrics is the aspect or context that researchers would investigate and 
target. For this research work, the performance metrics are ranging on coverage, 
efficiency, security management time. The mathematical equations and definitions of 
the Performance Metrics are elaborated in detail in chapter four. 
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Attack rate: In order to minimize the attacks rate and protecting the mobile user 
sensitive data from being retrieved, we need to reduce the attacks rate as much as we 
can: the attack rate has two pre-known sub-metrics namely: Attacker’s efficiency and 
Attacker’s coverage [12, 83, 142]. The equation for calculating these metrics is: 
1- Efficiency: The attacker’s efficiency is defined as the gain divided by the cost. To 
clarify more, the number of malicious VM that succeeds to co-locate with the target, 
divided by the total number of VMs launched by the attacker at time t. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 ) =
|𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑀(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑡)||
|𝑉𝑀(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑡)|
      (3.1) 
 
When to VMs attacker co-locate with the same target, it not counted two success co-
location but only as one co-location. This Efficiency is only for preventing co-
residence issue. However, it does not support the co-remote VMs (communication and 
interactions between VMs). The detailed of the efficiency of attack will be presented 
in chapter four. 
2- Coverage: The attacker’s coverage metric is considered another main criterion to 
evaluate the success of malicious attacker in allocating its VMs. The coverage is the 
number of malicious VMs that succeeds to co-locate with target, divided by the 
number of targets launched by legitimate user at time t.  
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 ) =
|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑀(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑡)|
|𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟,𝑡)|
                      (3.2) 
This Coverage is only for preventing the co-residence issue. However, it does not 
support the co-remote VMs (communication and interactions between VMs). The 
detailed of the coverage of attack will be presented in chapter four. 
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3- Normalized Execution time:   defined as the time needed for checking the VMs 
that access the cloud hosts whether attackers or legitimates, and VMs interaction 
whether legal or malicious. Devided by is the maximum checking time that can be 
spent for security time verification.   
Texcution = T security_VM_access + Tsecurity_VM_Interaction / Max (T security_VM_access + T 
security_VM_Interaction)                                                                                        (3.3)             
Chapter 4 four will present the detailed of the whole metrics. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented a detailed research methodology that was used to 
accomplish the research objectives. This research aims to come up with a security 
approach in MCC environment to support sensitive data protection localized on the 
virtual machines. The chapter started with the overall research methodology where the 
main steps involved were briefly described. The fundamental phases used in achieving 
the research objectives were highlighted and discussed. We have provided the 
conceptual model of the proposed secure proxy and its policies after the examination 
of the research area. Here by criticizing the existing solutions, a sufficient understand 
of the current research issues was determined. Moreover, we proposed and detailed the 
development approach process of our proposed research work that uses three security 
policies: Mobile user control access policy, Hypervisor policy and VMs 
communication policy.  The chapter then provided the performance evaluation section, 
which focuses on the evaluation step of the proposed approach. At last, the 
performance metrics used for proving the developed proxy based approach were 





PROXY-3S: A NEW SECURITY POLICIES-BASED PROXY FOR 
EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTED VIRTUAL MACHINES IN MOBILE 
CLOUD 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a novel cloud proxy called Three policies Secure cloud Proxy 
(Proxy-3S) that combines three powerful security policies: VMs user’s access control, 
VMs secure allocation and VMs secure communication. The approach aims to keep 
the distributed virtual machines safe in different servers in the cloud.  It enhances the 
robustness and grants access authorization to permit intensive distributed applications 
tasks on the cloud or mobile devices while processing and communicating private 
information between each other. Furthermore, an algorithm that enables secure 
communication among distributed VMs and protection of sensitive data in VMs on the 
cloud is proposed. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives the introduction of the chapter, 
which highlights the importance of the Proxy-3S proposed on securing the data on the 
mobile cloud environment. Section 4.2 provides an explanation on security metrics: 
efficiency, coverage, and execution time that are adopted in the proposed approach in 
order to study the performance of defending attacks and their execution time pertaining 
different VM allocation policies without taking in consideration our proposed solution 
(Normal situation of cloud Data processing). Section 4.3 describes the proposed 
approach with the general architecture and functional model of the cloud security 
system. The section provides details regarding the three secure polices of the approach. 
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Problem definition when an attacker intends to communicate or co-locate with VM 
users and improved security metrics are included. Section 4.4 gives detailed algorithms 
integrated into Proxy-3S based on secured exchanged hashed Diffie-Hellman Keys. 
Last Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by giving a summary of the complete chapter. 
4.2 Co-Residency Attacks and Performance Measures 
This section provides a detailed clarification of the co-resident attack that is performed 
inside servers on the cloud. The understanding of the co-resident problem and different 
goals of attackers either to target a clear set of VMs or have no specific target VMs to 
steal their sensitive data. The performance metrics to evaluate the attack are detailed 
precisely in order to be selected as the basic metrics in our mechanism. The 
comprehension of the whole problem leads us to adopt our solution for distributed 
VMs communication. 
4.2.1 Co-Residency Attacks 
There are two goals that an attacker can achieve through co-resident attacks. Firstly, 
the attacker has no clear set of target VMs. In this attack scenario, the attacker goal is 
to get an unfair share of the cloud resources [24, 143]. In Amazon EC2 platform, an 
attack case is revealed when some virtual machines consume more processing capacity 
and CPU time where it supposed to follow the hypervisor instructions and conditions 
which lead to reduce and steal the cloud service [151]. Secondly, the theft has main 
interest in the specific target of legitimate VMs. The attacker spread the malicious 
VMs with the targeted VMs in order to co-locate with them in the same server [145, 
146]. After the co-location is established, the Attacker VMs can obtain sensitive data 
by constructing various side channels. 
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Many ways can be used to detect co-location VMs, such as network measurement. The 
attacker proceeds with TCP traceroute operation when it intends to obtain the IP 
address of a VM’s management Domain 0 (Dom 0). Two VM’s are considered as co-
resident if their IP addresses Dom0 are the same. In the current cloud platform, this 
co-residence technique detection has been blocked.  
In order to achieve co-location, the attacker either spread as many VMs as possible on 
the cloud (brute-force strategy) or take the opportunity when multiple VMs launched 
at the same time (these VMs are allocated to the same host). An attacker can co-locate 
with target VMs on the same server by performing Prime-Probe cache timing 
measurement. In Prime-Probe cache timing, the technique is used for constructing 
coarse-grained side cache channels where the attacker waits for predefined time to fill 
and read from same memory cache sets that are used by other users. If the users use 
much cache (many activities), the attacker’s data will be excluded from the cache.  
Fine-grained side channels can be constructed to breach the confidentiality of tenants 
on cloud platforms. User sensitive information, computation tasks, and data must be 
isolated from either the malicious cloud provider or users. 
4.2.2 Normalized Performance Measures 
Generally, a defending mechanism should ensure the protection of sensitive 
information from any alteration and attackers intrusions. The proposed secure 
approach should be easily adopted in a cloud computing platform for preventing any 
fundamental changes that bring cost issues in term of complexity and security checking 
time. Defending security threats by sacrificing others metrics like load balancing and 
power consumption can affect the usability and performance of the cloud platform 
provider as well as may present new security problems. 
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VM allocation policy is one technique that is the focus of this thesis. In the best the 
researcher of knowledge, only two works have considered secure VM allocation as the 
best solution to secure private information [30,12]. The VMs allocation policy mainly 
makes it hard for attackers to achieve co-resident. The research adopts the metrics of 
[12] for evaluating the security aspect of the proposed approach. 
Obviously, it is better to explain the security metrics (efficiency, coverage) of [12] and 
then introduce our theory contribution regarding these metrics for adoption in VMs 
co-remote problem. The security metrics are defined as efficiency, coverage and 
execution time which are discussed in the next sub-section.     
1- Efficiency 
Spreading the minimum malicious VMs for achieving co-location is considered as the 
best scenario for cloud VMs attacker. The efficiency is defined as the gain divided by 
the cost. To clarify more, the number of malicious VM that succeeds to co-locate with 
the target, then it is divided by the total number of VMs launched by the attacker. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡)) =
|𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑀(𝐴,𝑡)||
|𝑉𝑀(𝐴,𝑡)|
  (4.1) 
Where:  
- A: refers to the attacker. 
- 𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡): refers to VMs of  A 
- 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡)|: refers to the total of servers of VMs 
attackers which succeed to co-locate with the target, t is the exact time. 
- 𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡): is the total VMs launched by an attacker in time t.  
When two VM attackers co-locate with the same target, it is not counted as two success 
co-location but only as one co-location. This Efficiency is only for preventing the co-
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residence issue. However, it does not support the co-remote VMs (communication and 
interactions between VMs). 
2- Coverage 
The coverage metric is considered another main criterion to evaluate the success of the 
malicious attacker in allocating its VMs. The coverage is the number of malicious 
VMs that succeeds to co-locate with the target, and then it is divided by the number of 




                                             (4.2) 
Where:  
- A: refers to the attacker. 
- 𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡): refers to VMs of  A. 
- SuccTarget 𝑉𝑀(𝐴, 𝑡): refers to the sum of VMs machine attackers which 
succeed to co-locate with the target, t is the exact time. 
- 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡(𝐴, 𝑡): is the sum of all VMs target in time t. 
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Figure 4.1. Computation example of attacks efficiency and coverage. 
The efficiency here is 3/8 and the coverage is 3/4. The efficiency and coverage 
consider as probability values that vary between 0 and 1 continuously. Whereas, 
security execution time is considered as a continuous variable that measured with 
seconds or milliseconds and the value grows from 0 to a large time rate.   
3- Normalized Execution Time  
It is the total time taken by the security mechanism to finalize its processes. The time 
is from the time of user submission tasks until the time of the result delivered to the 
right users.  The security execution time plays the main important role to deliver the 
cloud service to the client. If the value is positive, then it meets the expectation of 
cloud users. However, it affects performance and fails to meet user satisfaction. The 
processes of the mechanism are the time to check the VM and time to check the 
interaction between VMs.  
The normalized execution time is computed as follow: 
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Texcution = T security_VM_access + Tsecurity_VM_Interaction / Max (T security_VM_access + T 
security_VM_Interaction)                           (4.3)  
Where: 
Tsecurity_VM_access: refers to the average time needed to verify the security key correctness 
provided by a VM and the access time of VM. 
Tsecurity_VM_Interaction: refers to the average time needed to check the interaction  
legitimacy between VMs. 
Max (Tsecurity_VM_access + Tsecurity_VM_Interaction): is the maximum checking time that can be 
spent for security time verification.   
4.3 The Proposed Approach 
The new cloud Three policies Security Proxy (Proxy-3S) approach helps to enhance 
the security of distributed VMs and enables the enforcement of corporate security 
policies for protecting the mobile user’s sensitive information on the cloud.  The 
novelty of the proposed approach provides: (1) a valuable balance between VM control 
access and good performance, scalability, robustness, and efficiency (2) a secure 
verification process and hierarchical protection of the sensitive data of distributed VMs 
from any malicious attackers in the cloud. The approach is based on three security 
policies that are collaborating to guarantee the user’s sensitive data integrity and 
confidentiality from the input point (sender mobile device) to the output (receiver 
mobile device or cloud). The access to private VM’s data is not public, thus we use 
Proxy-3S in order to enforce authorization access to the VMs on the cloud and give a 
sight of management of users’ VMs. In order to reduce the cost overhead of the cloud 
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resources, the user’s data is processed inside those VMs. In addition, the result of data 
processing eventually returns to mobile devices.  
4.3.1 General Architecture and Functional Model 
The approach composes of two sub-sections, namely general architecture and 
functional model.   
4.3.1.1 General Architecture  
In this section, we propose the approach design to ensure the security of distributed 
VMs integrated into cloud architecture. Figure 4.2 depicts a general overview of 
security architecture. The mobile client connects to cloud services through secure 
Proxy-3S. The architecture consists of three components:  
a. Client: this is the mobile application that is currently deployed on Smartphones, 
tablets or PCs. 
b. The Secure Cloud Proxy-3S: the Proxy-3S is the core of our system that plays as 
the mandatory entity between the mobile application site and the cloud server. It also 
secures and manages the VMs that are authorized to handle sensitive data on the 
mobile cloud environment. When a mobile user request services from the cloud 
environment, it offloads the intensive processing tasks to the cloud and wait for the 
results. Since the secure proxy deploys the application. It runs the three security 
policies to identify the possible malicious attacks between the mobile user and the 
cloud or between collaborated VMs on the cloud. The Proxy-3S integrates mobile user 
control policy, virtual machine management protection policy and secure virtual 
machine communication policy into a single offering or unit. 
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 Mobile User Control Access Policy Component: this is the first component 
aiming to control the access of the mobile users’ devices into the cloud. It only 
authorizes the permitted users to leverage cloud services. It consists of a list of 
authorized users with their encrypted password, the users’ status that informs the 
proxy of the trust level of the users that facilitate access control and make decision 
authorization whether the user is allowed to access the cloud service or no 
(denied). 
 Virtual Machine Manager Protection Policy Component: A cloud hypervisor 
is a software that creates, deletes and updates when needed the VMs on specific 
servers that they assign to the guest mobile user. In order to secure the hypervisor, 
the huge VMs need to manage silently or securely to avoid the deployment of 
malicious VMs. The policy based on proxy detection and order prevents the illegal 
VM to co-locate with legal VMs. 
 Secure Virtual Machines Communication Policy Component: The VMs form 
a network VM while communicate and transfer the data with each other across 
multiple virtual channels on the datacenter. Secure communication is provided 
using symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic methods. The policy contains the 
VM communication information that helps ensure security compliance and secure 
communication to and from VMs. The management information includes the VMs 
originated by the mobile user, its identifier, the communication trust level and the 
current session with the encrypted password. This policy aims to secure the 
sensitive user’s data confidentiality and privacy that exchanged among VMs. 
c. The Cloud: it defines a network of VMs connected between each other by sending 




Figure 4.2. Overview of security architecture 
In the next section, we will give the detail of the functional model of the system where 
mobile tenants intend to access the cloud service in order to process their intensive 
tasks on cloud servers. 
4.3.1.2 Functional Model of the Security Cloud System  
The objective of the proposed security system is to ensure that the user’s mobile 
applications and their sensitive data are protected from unauthorized access and 
malicious VMs in the cloud.  An overview of the functional model of the security 




Figure 4.3. The functional model of security three policies Proxy-based approach 
The proxy manages distributed mobile applications which run on different 
server operating systems either in mobile device or data center. It consists of various 
tasks that consider either heavy or light tasks. The mobile device can process the light 
tasks, but the intensive task must execute on cloud servers. The proxy ensures the 
security of managed intensive computational tasks and their sensitive data in the cloud. 
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The process ends when the system delivers results to the mobile user and intensive-
tasks are finished. We detail the functional process as follows: 
▪ Firstly, users request to deploy their intensive tasks on the cloud. They send their 
identifiers and passwords through a mobile device to the Proxy.  
▪ Secondly, the proxy receives the user identifier and password of users. Then it 
calls the Mobile User Control Access Component (MUCA) in order to check 
the authentication of the user where the proxy must recognize the user at the 
first, otherwise the access is denied. If the user’s credentials are correct, then the 
proxy sends an order for the hypervisor to allocate VMs for the user depending 
on various offloaded intensive tasks. Each VM is associated with a secret key, 
which allows it to control the VMs behavior by its VMs manager protection 
module where the VM can be legal or malicious. If the VM is legal, the module 
keeps it inside the server for processing the user task. 
▪ Thirdly, the VM takes to delivering their obtained intermediate results to its 
other VMs is anchored in the cloud security proxy system and the associated 
Secure VMs Communication Component. The VMs deliver their obtained 
intermediate results to the secure proxy system. After that, the proxy shares 
secure results with other Secure VMs Communication Component. By using 
these components, we have checked the credibility of the VM that would 
communicate. If the VM is legal, the proxy allows the communication between 
the sender and receiver VM. Therefore, the tasks can share sensitive data 
between them.  
▪ Finally, when intensive tasks are completed, the proxy sends the result to the 
mobile user and removes VMs that finish their tasks process from the host cloud. 
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4.4 Virtual Machines Communication Security in Cloud Computing  
In this section, we present some improvements regarding the efficiency and coverage 
of external attacks compared to the work of [12, 83]. Then we describe the problem 
definition and an overview of our proposed approach.     
4.4.1 Improved Efficiency and Coverage Metrics  
Distributed mobile applications have many tasks deployed on cloud computing 
servers, and the tasks are performed in various VMs. When tasks communicate with 
each other, they exchange various forms of private information. In the cloud, data 
security and privacy of the distributed application have several threats that impact the 
application. An attacker can deploy malicious VMs in either the same or different 
server. Authors in [83] studied experimental deployments of VMs in different 
scenarios using different allocation strategies. The study develops co-residency 
security metrics called efficiency and coverage in order to increase difficulties to VM 
attackers to co-locate with legal VMs. However, these metrics have not been used in 
analyzing and evaluating VMs communication, whereby VMs are deployed on 
different hosts and communicate to exchange sensitive information. Therefore, we 
include these metrics in VMs communication attacks study. In the proposed approach, 
we define the remote co-location attack when having a successful VM’s attacker that 
communicates with at least one of the target legal deployed on the different hosts. In 
work [12, 83], two metrics are proposed for detecting the attack, namely efficiency 
and coverage. We used these two metrics and improved in our approach as follows. 
(Table 4.1 details used notations): 
Definition 1 (Efficiency): is the ratio of the number of malicious VM that are 
successfully co-located with the target, divided by to the total number of VMs attacker 
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launched. Due to the exchanges between VMs in a distributed mobile application, 
while deployed in different hosts on the cloud, the efficiency metric of [83] is used and 
improved. Now, the efficiency is the ratio of the number of success attacker’s co-
location subtracted from the total number of newly detected attackers, divided by to 
the total number of VMs attacker and VMs attacker interaction. The efficiency metric 
for the remote co-located attacker “A” is defined as follows: 
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦(│𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐴, 𝑡)│) = |𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑀(𝐴,𝑡)|− 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟
|𝑉𝑀 (𝐴,𝑡)|+|𝑉𝑀_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴,𝑡)|
                (4.4) 
Where newly detected attackers are the total number of VMs attacker recognized as 
legal before the proxy detection (i.e. interaction between VM attacker and another VM 
attacker is not considered remote co-location or co-location). 
Definition 2 (Coverage): is the number of VMs attackers that are successfully co-
located with legal VMs divided by the target VMs (legal). Due to the interaction 
between VMs in distributed mobile applications that communicate between each other 
while deployed in different hosts on the cloud, the coverage metric of [83] is used and 
improved. Now, the coverage considers the security property relative to the data 
exchanges between two VMs (attacker and legal). It is defined as the ratio of the 
number of successful attacker’s co-location subtracted from the total number of new 
detected attacker, divided to the total number of VMs legal and VMs legal interaction. 




                   (4.5) 
Table 4.1.   
Detailed notations regarding the security metrics 
  
Notation  Description 
D The Datacenter 
N The total number of servers in Datacenters 
A Refers to attacker 
L Refers to legal VMs 
Servers ({a set of VMs}) Servers that host the set of VMs 
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VM (L, t) The set of VMs started by L at time t 
VM (A, t) Refer to VMs of  A started during one attack at 
time t 
Target(A) The target set of VMs that A intends either to 
co-locate or to communicate with in time t, 
Target(A) = ∑t VM(L, t), |Target (A)| = T 
SuccTarget VM (A, t) Refer to the sum of VMs machine attackers, 
which succeed to co-locate with the target, t is 
the exact time. 
NewDetected_Attacker The VM attacker that behaving like VM legal 
before the detection from the proxy. This 




Refers to the total VMs attacker interactions 
channels with target VMs launched by an 
attacker in time t, both successful malicious 
communication and unsuccessful malicious 
communication.s 




Refers to the sum of channels of VMs attackers 
which success to interact with the target VM, t 
is the exact time. 
Unsucc_malicious_communication (A, t) 
 
Refers to the sum of channels of VMs attackers 
which unsuccessful to interact with the target 
VM, t is the exact time. 
VM_interaction (L, t) 
 
Refers to the total VMs legal interactions 
channels with another VMs launched by a legal 
VM in time t, both successful legal 
communication and unsuccessful legal 
communication . 
Succ_Legal_communication (L, t) 
 
 
Refers to the sum of channels of VMs legal 
which success to communicate with the target 
VM, t is the exact time 
Unsucc_Legal_communication (L, t) 
 
Refers to the sum of channels of VMs legal 
which un-success to interact with the target 
VM, t is the exact time. Unsuccessful means 
that VM legal communicate with VM attacker 
that behaving as legal. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows five legal VMs deployed on different hosts. The Attacker “A” starts 
seven VMs, four of which co-locate with three legal VMs and two remote VMs co-
locate with two legal VMs. The proposed efficiency and coverage metrics that include 
the communication aspect among a set of legal and attackers VMs dispersed across 




















Figure 4.4. Computation example of attacks efficiency and coverage using the 
communication aspect. 
The difference between this research and [12, 83] research work is that their policy 
does not provide an exhaustive solution since their metrics do not consider the 
malevolent communication attacks.  
In this example, the success co-location of VMs attacker is 3 (success target) and new 
detected attacker is 0.  For the VMs interaction, there is 2 VMs interaction, where it is 
considered as successful malicious communication launched by VMs attacker. 
Otherwise, the VMs attacker has no unsuccessful malicious communication. 
Regarding VMs legal, there is two interaction received by them, which are considered 
as unsuccessful legal communication. Whereas successful legal communication is 
equal to 0. Thus, the efficiency is 3/9 (instead of 3/7 in [83]), and the coverage is 3/7 




4.4.2 Problem Definition and Security Modeling  
Assume that several attackers intend to communicate or co-locate with legal VMs. 
Therefore, the main objective of an attacker is to maximize the coverage and/or 
efficiency rate. When the VM attacker communicates with a legal VM and both of 
them are located on different hosts, it is considered that VM attacker is co-located with 
VM legal. Hence, considering the communication aspect between VMs, the problem 
is how to reduce the efficiency and the coverage of the attacker as well as how to 
increase the number of users using the cloud servers without increasing the coverage 
and efficiency of attack. Then, by using our secure approach, we are able to measure 
both the attacker’s efficiency and coverage to identify the remote co-resident attackers. 
The problem takes into account the following descriptions: 
- DC = {dc1, dc2…, dcN}, denotes N datacenters of a cloud system. Each 
datacenter dci contains a set of M servers S = {S1, S2… SM} having the same 
hardware resources. 
- The set VM = {vm1, vm2…, vmP} of P virtual machines. For each virtual 
machine vmi (i=1, 2,…p) can be allocated to a server Sj (j=1,2,…M) by the projection 
X: V x U  S.  
- The set U = {u1, u2,…, uk} of k users. Each user can be categorized into two 
types: legal or attacker, denoted as L and A respectively, where for each legal 
user, a set of legal VMs started by L at time t denoted by VM (L, t) while for 
attacker a set of VM attackers started by A at time t denoted by VM (A, t). 
We propose three security policies: (1) the first mobile user access control policy is 
based on hashed encrypted access keys to get a powerful user’s access technique, (2) 
the second secure VM allocation policy is based on minimum CPU utilization and 
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minimum channels communication with  secure VM communication policy is based 
on secure communication channel access through hashed encrypted communication 
keys that offer high security once exchange sensitive data among VMs. These policies 
improve the efficiency and coverage of attack while the interaction of VMs deployed 
on different servers and communicate with each other. In the following figure, there 
are two main actors that Proxy-3S handles their information in order to provide access 
to service cloud or data in VMs.  
The first actor is a mobile user. When the mobile user configures its session, he 
provides the MAC address that automatically retrieved from the OS of its mobile 
device Duser ①. When the Proxy-3S receives the MAC address, it generates a random 
secret number called Secret deployment Iteration “S_It1” ② to use it as input with 
MAC address (second input) in key generation function GKu (Generation Key User). 
S_It1 is a random number greater than 1000. The generation function GKu produces 
two different keys: a private user access key Kupv and a public user access key Kupb 
③.  The current keys is stored in the key registry by the proxy. The private key is 
unique for each user, and is sent once (or updated when needed as a new session) when 
a user asking for deploying a task ④⑤. In order to authorize a mobile user to deploy 
a task, a private user access key is used and the signed MAC address Sig@Macd is 
constructed ⑥. This signed address is sent together with the corresponding task 
identifier to the proxy ⑦. On the other hand, regarding the proxy side to accept a task 
deployment from a user, it must checks the signed MAC address ⑥. Then, in the cloud 
and using the symmetric properties of Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption, the signature 
must be verified using only Hash MAC address stored in the key registry⑧. If the 
signature is checked, the proxy asks the hypervisor to deploy the user’s task⑨. The 




Figure 4.5. Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption and decryption process 
The second actor is a VM. When the VM intends to communicate with another VM 
whether allocated on the same host or different host. It provides its VM identifier that 
proxy receives it with the request of communication VMuser ①. The proxy generates 
a random secret number of deployment Iteration “S_It1” ② to use it as input with VM 
identifier in key generation function GKu (Generation Key User).  The generation 
function GKu produces two different keys: a private VM access key Kvmpv and a public 
VM access key Kvmpv ③. The current VM keys are stored in the VMs key registry of 
the proxy. The private key is updated when needed as new communication session 
④⑤. The message that VM intend to send is Hashed and encrypted to produce a 
signed message (hard to decrypt by the adversary) ⑥. Further, the signed message 
with encrypted identifier is sent to the proxy and the proxy decrypted and compare 
with the existing Hash message. If the signature message is correct then the message 
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will be authorized to be sent for VM receiver ⑦⑧⑨. The diagram flow is described 
at the bottom of Figure 4.5. 
The security of the proposed technique depends on the session identifier in the 
generation phases after encrypting with the Hash-Diffie Hellman. In addition, each 
attacker VM attempt to extract the sensitive data must know the same session identifier 
key S_It established in the generation function. Otherwise, the VM attackers will be 
denied. The key size of the proposed scheme is large enough to resist brute-force 
attacks. In other words, if an attacker tries to find out the session key used for accessing 
VM’s data, the attacker needs to perform a number of operations of (1000 x 231-1)! To 
this end, we could conclude that the proposed model provides high confidentiality for 
the sensitive VM’s data.  
4.5 Proxy-based security policies details 
We present our proxy-based security policies over distributed VMs that run on 
different hosts on the cloud (see Figure 4.6). The objective of these policies is to 
combine the Hash-Diffie Hellman and secure VM algorithms to automatically 
protecting users’ data integrity and confidentiality in the cloud. Considering the high 
capabilities of defending against the confidentiality and integrity of data attacks, we 
will often choose a more practical Hash-Diffie Hellman method. The research used the 
long-term usability of the SHA-256 algorithm. This is the strongest hashing algorithm 
used by popular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Counterparty, 
MazaCoin [140]. So far, SHA-256 secure hashing algorithm is never compromised in 
any way as well as its implementation is easier than the predecessor hash function 
SHA-1 and provides a hash that cannot be broken. Hence, this motivates controlling 
the mobile user’s access and protecting VM’s data by SHA-256 Diffie-Hellman in our 
112 
 
approach. National Institute of Standards and Technology has provided various 
security check test to verify the correctness of data integrity in communication aspect 
[154].  Proxy-3S consists of three policies collaborating for ensuring the protection of 
distributed VMs and sensitive data integrity and confidentiality. Proxy-3S takes the 
user’s requests and the information of the devices as inputs. Once the whole requested 
tasks are executed securely and legally, the result is sent back to the user. This is done 
on the following three main steps: 
 Step1 (Figure 4.6): the proxy calls MUAC Authentication policy (see 
Algorithm 1) to provide authorization decision for users to get access to the 
proxy. This is done by checking the user identifier and password with the 
available authorized users. 
 Step2 (Figure 4.6): the proxy calls Secure VM Allocation policy (see 
Algorithm 2) to secure VMs allocation against malicious attacks based on 
various extended allocation strategies (most, least and random). The VMs 
allocation policy checks and compares the secret key with the available secret 
keys required for the VM allocation. 
 Step3 (Figure 4.6): the proxy calls VM Communication Protection policy (see 
Algorithm 4)   to protect the user's sensitive data and access requests on the 





Figure 4.6. Proxy-based policies details. 
4.5.1 Mobile User Access Control and Authentication Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 depicts the user authentication policy to secure the user’s sensitive data 







It takes the user request and its device information as input. The signed password is 
sent over an authenticated session using the secure interface to a Proxy-3S for 
decryption. The algorithm applies Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption techniques and 
returns the authorization decision. This is done by following four major steps: 
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 Step 1 (line 1): The Proxy-3S receives the identifier (encrypted signature) of 
the mobile user. It decrypts the encrypted signature to extract out the hash 
codes.  
 Step2 (lines 2 - 3): The Proxy-3S checks the blacklist table and denies access 
if the user’s mobile device is on the list.  
 Step3 (lines 4 - 17): It compares the extracted hash code (line 5) with the 
available authorized hash codes. The access control module uses a User 
Authentication table for all managed mobile users. Once the Proxy-3S finds 
the hash code, it gives the user a full authorization access level (i.e.: Green 
level), then it sends the requests to the hypervisor in order to create a VM for 
the user. After the VM is created on the cloud’s host, the intensive task is 
allocated on the VM.   If the Proxy-3S does not find any matched hash code, it 
increments the probability of unauthorized access. The increment of 0.1 is 
applied once any checking fail of hash codes occurs.  Proxy-3S checks the user 
status if the current probability access is upper than the probability of 
unauthorized access threshold (e.g., 0.7) then inserts the user’s mobile device 
on the blacklist table. 
The User Authentication table contains hash encrypted codes. With the hash code, it 
is impossible to know the MAC address and password of the user. In this case, the 
malicious cloud provider cannot know the user’s name and password, and if the 
database of the cloud is accessed, no one can know the right values. The hashing 
preserves the integrity and confidentiality. 
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4.5.2 Secure VM allocation Algorithm for resisting co-residence 
The pseudo code of Secure VM Allocation policy for resisting co-residence is 
presented in Algorithm 2. It is used to allocate the VMs securely and isolate them from 
malicious VMs. The input consists of the authorization decision, which is the output 
of the mobile user’s access algorithm and the intended task to be deployed. The 
algorithm ensures the security of VM-based task. The output of the proposed algorithm 
consists of a list of deployed VMs based on their final checking decisions. In general, 
Secure VM Allocation can be divided into the following steps: 
 Step 1 (lines 2): Proxy-3S is responsible to allocate the VMs of the user on the 
cloud servers. It uses three well-known VM allocation policies either: most, 
least, random [12]. These policies are enriched including Hash-Diffie Hellman 





1. Secure most allocation policy: where this policy allocates the VMs on the 
cloud server that contains the greater number of VMs. We improve this policy 
by considering two parameters (as seen in Algorithm 3): the security (i.e. hash 
and encryption algorithms to secure high trusted host that deploy the new VM) 
and energy saving (i.e. CPU utilization of hosts, data traffics of 
communication channels). Once the new VM has been deployed, the sensitive 
data is sent to the VM to be handled. 
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2. Secure least allocation policy: where this policy allocates the VMs on the 
cloud server that contains the less number of VMs. We improve this policy by 
considering two parameters: the security (i.e. hash and encryption algorithms 
to secure high trusted host that deploy the new VM) and energy saving (i.e. 
CPU utilization of hosts, data traffics of communication channels).  
 
3. Secure random allocation policy: where this policy allocates the VMs on the 
cloud server randomly. We improve this policy by considering two 
parameters: the security (hash and encryption algorithms to secure high trusted 
host that deploy the new VM) and energy saving (.e. CPU utilization of hosts, 
data traffics of communication channels). 
 Step2 (lines 3-27): Proxy-3S must check the user authentication table in order 
to allow or to stop the allocation of VM. It requests the user identifier and its 
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encrypted secret key in order to check the authenticity of the corresponding 
user. The checking algorithm presents two situations: 
 If the Proxy-3S fails to authenticate user, it increments the user 
unauthorized probability. If the current unauthorized probability is upper 
than the probability of unauthorized allocation (e.g., 0.7), it sets the current 
user as Malicious user (and puts it in user blacklist table) and stops the VM 
allocation process on the host. It also broadcasts the identity of the 
malicious user to all other users. 
 If the Proxy-3S recognizes the user is legal. Proxy-3S sends a request to 
the hypervisor in order to allocate the VM. It gives a session time to any 
VM hosted on the cloud. This session time is to control the VM and its 
behavior continuously. If a VM does not react correctly in the server, 
Proxy-3S removes it from the host.  
4.5.3 Secure VMs Communication Algorithm for resisting remote co-residence 
The pseudo code of Secure VMs Communication policy for resisting co-residence is 
presented in Algorithm 4. Through algorithm 4, it is possible to authorize VMs to 
access to the exchanged sensitive data. The algorithm takes as input VMs List to 
collaborate. The communication decision returned by this algorithm encompasses the 
permission to access the exchanged data. This is done in following three major steps: 
 Step1 (lines 2): When the VM requests another VM for exchanging data, the 
Proxy-3S checks the secure keys of VM that intend to communicate through 
its table called VM Communication Authentication table. 
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 Step2 (lines 2-4): If the Proxy-3S checks the correctness of exchanged keys, it 
asks the Hypervisor to allow communication among VMs to exchange 
sensitive data. 
 
 Step 3 (lines 5-22): If the Proxy-3S fails to identify the VM sender, it 
increments the VM trust level. If the current trust level is upper than the 
probability of unauthorized communications (i.e., 0.7 thresholds), it sets the 





In this chapter, we have presented a new Three Policies secure cloud Proxy called 
Proxy-3S for preventing the access of malevolent users to cloud services as well as 
ensuring the data integrity and confidentiality of user’s sensitive data across 
collaborating VMs on the cloud environment.   
To our best knowledge, none of the existing works takes into consideration the 
communication aspect between the VMs that performing distributed application’s 
tasks on various hosts. In addition, we control the sensitivity of data across different 
distributed VMs. This will improve the efficiency and coverage of attack. Moreover, 
the chapter presented Proxy-3S with its three security policies. The first policy is 
intended to manage the access rights of the user when deploying their VMs. The 
second policy is aimed to protect the hypervisor and preventing the break-down of 
isolated VMs. The third policy provided secure communication between VMs that 
transferring sensitive data between each other. 
In the next chapter, we will present a new design of an extended secure simulation tool 








SecNetworkCloudSim: AN EXTENSIBLE SIMULATION TOOL 
FOR SECURE DISTRIBUTED MOBILE APPLICATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four identified the security metrics that will be used to evaluate the 
performance of the secure approach in cloud computing. Further of presenting the 
security metrics, it presented three well-detailed algorithms that can be used to secure 
the VMs of users and quantify the proposed approach performance. In order to evaluate 
our security approach. A Java-based prototype is implemented on a powerful 
extensible simulator named: SecNetworkCloudSim which is an extended simulation 
tool of NetworkCloudSim in order to allow managing VMs security and data 
confidentiality automatically. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 presents the extended secure 
layers in NetworkCloudSim simulator. Section 5.3 provides the design implementation 
of SecNetworkCloudSim which presents the main integrated classes in 
NetworkCloudSim. Further, the Simulation execution workflow of the 
SecNetworkCloudSim is presented in this Section. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the 
chapter.  
5.2 An Extended Security Simulation Tool  
Due to the need of well understanding the cloud paradigm technology capabilities, a 
number of cloud simulators are available today such as CloudSim [124], Green Cloud 
[127], iCanCloud [128], GroudSim[129], NetworkCloudSim [130], secCloudSim 
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[131]. Such simulators are fruitful for cost analysis and advanced architecture as Cloud 
Computing. Whereas other simulation-based tools focus on power energy 
consumption, scheduling and allocation mechanisms, communication and networking 
between VMs.  
Augmenting cloud computing simulators with mobile distributed tasks that handle 
sensitive data is considered an important challenge. Arguably, the greatest difficulty 
boils down to perform the different usage scenarios with different amounts of data over 
both unsecured VMs and malicious users in order to evaluate and analyze security 
algorithms. To overcome this challenge, few simulators [155] are offering cloud 
security challenges to control access data on top of the security techniques. However, 
this requires knowledge of security algorithms details which is not all users have and 
also requires spending significant amounts of time writing secure cloud infrastructure 
code. To clarify more, it is the task of a scientist to find solid and complete security 
mechanisms to encrypt/ decrypt and well protect sensitive data. 
5.2.1 SecNetworkCloudSim: Secure Network Cloud Simulator  
Key to the development of the simulator as a system for integrated security is the 
adoption of advanced researchers’ policies and approaches that covers both the VM 
allocation and communications aspects while ensuring the protection of the user’s 
private data among different virtual machines. In particular, the proposed simulator 
capable of managing the security of VMs, creating and allocating VMs based policies, 
deploying tasks and securing the data exchange between different VMs whether inside 
host or distributed hosts, as well as various network data centers. One of the main goals 
of this research is to extend the NetworkCloudSim architecture enables to model the 
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VM-based distributed mobile applications and guarantee secure access to the user’s 
sensitive data.  
After studying several cloud simulators tools, we choose to extend secure layers in 
NetworkCloudSim. NetworkCloudSim is considered one of the most powerful toolkit 
that gives ability to codify the behavior of very complex cloud system [130]. 
NetworkCloudSim does not provide classes to consider the security aspect. Since it 
does not integrates secure algorithms and policies on the cloud-computing 
environment to secure communications between distributed VMs. Otherwise, user’s 
confidential data could be put at risk. Overcoming these limitations, we extend 
NetworkCloudSim simulator with new layer called Cloud Three Security Proxy 
(Proxy-3S) with three security policies in order to provide flexible simulation of the 
various security policies especially that those that focus on data client protection on 
the cloud side.  
In this section, we present the NetworkCloudSim extension that ensures data security 
on the cloud. The extended NetworkCloudSim enables us to model VM-based 
distributed mobile applications and guarantee secure access to private data. 
5.2.2 Main Functional building modules  
Based on the principles specified in the architecture model of NetworkCloudSim, 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the main functional building modules of the 
SecNetworkCloudSim.  
In particular, in the User code layer, regarding the application we integrate the 
following functional building modules:  
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1. Distributed Application Configuration module: in order to configure the 
application with multiple intensive tasks running on different cloud servers, the 
simulator allows the user to configure the application and defines the cloudlet’s 
requirements in terms of needed resources like RAM, CPU (Pes cores), bandwidth and 
storage capacity. Moreover, the user can set the name, domain and environment 
platform of the application. 
 
Figure 5.1. SecNetworkCloudSim architecture 
2. Mobile User Control Access (MUCA) policy module: The simulator supports the 
integration of user’s control access that receive, encrypt/decrypt and check security 
information of the mobile user. Typically, this module uses the hash SHA 256 and 
Diffie-Hellman algorithms. The user sends the encrypted password (signature) and the 
module checks the validity of the signature by decrypting the signature to hash codes 
and verifying it with available list of hash codes. Fig 5.2 shows the result of secure 
user authentication with the hash Diffie-Hellman schema. The access of mobile device 
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to the cloud service needs the MAC authentication process. MUCA receives the MAC 
address, uses the SHA-256 to encrypt and protect it from leakage in distributed 
environment (line 3). After that, the same algorithm hash both the ciphertext and the 
signature again (line 5). MUCA provides the signature to the mobile user as a secret 
password. The experimental results show that the proposed simulation tool’s module 
(MUCA) identifies early signs of attacks. 
Line 1 User Address MAC: 1234.5628.1234.5678 
Line 2 Hash of the Mobile device MAC address:  
Line 3 949f411e20378b55b2d0bb1d17bb32b3b932bdf059ca2d2126406831cca38c72 
Line 4 Encryption step.... 
Line 5 Encryption signature.... [B@233c0b17 
Line 6 Decryption step.... 
Line 7 Final result.... 
Line 8 949f411e20378b55b2d0bb1d17bb32b3b932bdf059ca2d2126406831cca38c72 
 
Figure 5.2. Results of secure user authentication with hash Diffie-Hellman schema 
In the middle layer of NetworkCloudSim, we integrate the following functional 
modules in order to protect the user information provided by mobile applications from 
unauthorized access and malicious users, as well securing the offloading process of 
applications’ tasks using VM in the cloud and ensuring the distributed communications 
security between VMs allocated in different hosts:  
1. Secure Hypervisor: This module provides secure allocation management system 
(e.g. creates, runs and destroys a virtual machine on the cloud environment) and 
enables the isolation and separation between different virtual machines. However, 
many attacks can break isolation and extract sensitive data from legitimate virtual 
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machines, so the secure hypervisor provides a robust encryption key 
management schemas that include AES 128 bit encryption schema. The latter also 
checks all the VMs that run on the cloud server in session time. If a virtual machine 
provides an uncorrected key so the module will directly tear out resources and destroy 
the VM.  
2. Secure Virtual Machine: The simulator provides the full lifecycle of 
encryption keys to virtual machines and protecting them from attacks. The VM 
lifecycle includes the control of the VM behavior when it takes a long time activities 
than a threshold time interval. Therefore, the VM considers as an attacker.  
3. Secure Virtual Machine Allocation: The Secure Virtual Machine Allocation 
module is the functional module that secures the VMs allocation based on three 
security policies: secure VMs most allocation, secure least VMs allocation and secure 
VMs random policy. These policies control VMs of the users, explicitly allocate the 
VMs on the safe cloud host where they deployed and isolated from VMs attacker.  
4. Secure Virtual Machines Communication: The security of VMs communication 
is the core-building module that enables security insights based on early detection of 
VMs attacker using advanced communication policies. This latter uses the Hash-Diffie 
Hellman algorithm and a robust communication policy to secure information 
exchanges against malicious VMs and threats over unsecured channels. Further, the 
module detects the VM that pretends like legal VM but in the communication explore 
malicious behavior. The secure virtual machines communication interacts with a 
secure networked data center module. 
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5. The Secure Networked Datacenter: This Secure Networked Data Center provides 
a secure network between different datacenters that engage in the interaction of the 
user’s confidential and private data.  
6. Secure VM management: The module provides isolation between VMs in order to 
avoid the co-location with attacker VMs. This module gives a trust status level to 
highly manage the deployment and communication aspect by leaving the processing 
of VM or remove it from the cloud host. 
7. Secure application: secure application consist of many tasks collaborating with 
each other in secure manner. The hash and Diffie-Hellman algorithms provide the 
cloudlets that communicate a secure way to send data between them without any 
interception from a third malicious party.    
8. Secure Network: includes the cryptography methods either symmetric or 
asymmetric.  
5.3 Design and implementation of SecNetworkCloudSim 
In this section, we present the main classes of SecNetworkCloudSim, which are also 
composed of many functional classes to ensure the data security on the cloud and 
enable the modeling of distributed mobile applications, hosts (mobile devices or 
cloud), VMs, cloudlets, a secure proxy and VMs security policies.  
5.3.1 Modeling of SecNetworkCloudSim 
Figure 5.3 presents a generic overview of the class diagram of SecNetworkCloudSim 
architecture. In SecNetworkCloudSim, class User represents the mobile user that 
intends to leverage and access to cloud services. Thereby, the cloud services access is 
restrained only to authorized users that having main security requirements: identifier, 
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password and mobile device identifier (i.e. @MAC). When a user sends its request 
(i.e. offloads the intensive task for process on virtual machines, stores private data and 
demands-resources allocation), he provides the address Mac of mobile address and his 
password. If the user authentication is verified by Secure Cloud proxy then the user’s 
task is deployed, else a denied access is sent. 
Mobile Device class represents the mobile devices (e.g. PC, smartphone, Tablet, etc.) 
which they have limited computing resources. It is uniquely identified by a fixed Mac 
address. A User might switch between different mobile devices. 
Distributed Mobile Application class describes the resources-intensive application 
that needs to be allocated in different distributed virtual machines and servers in the 
datacenter. A distributed application consisting of a set of distributed intensive tasks 
deployed on different hosts in a target environment.  
Task class represents the computational element of distributed mobile applications. 
We distinguish between light and intensive tasks. The light task is performed on the 
mobile devices themselves, whereas the intensive task is handled on the cloud 
computing resources and results back afterward. The intensive task can be classified 
in provided and required tasks. Provided task is defined as the capacity needed to the 
task consumer to handle the fundamental cloud computing resources.  
Cloudlet class is the job submitted by the mobile user for processing a task on the 
cloud. The cloudlet in SecNetworkCloudSim is characterized by the job’s length, time 
and cloudlet type. Each cloudlet has its own cloudlet ID and runs in a specific VM. A 
VM can host and run several cloudlets.  
Secure Cloud Proxy represents the key class that manages both the user’s data access 
and communication aspects of the VMs’ security in terms of the algorithms that 
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monitor the security policies to protect the sensitive data against unauthorized access. 
The unauthorized access probability threshold is used to identify the VMs whether the 
VM is legal or attacker. The attacker is denied access and removed from the host. 
Different security policies have been utilized in order to ensure the data protection and 




Figure 5.3.  SecNetworkCloudSim class diagram 
Mobile User Control Access: this class is useful for legitimate users to access the 
services provided by the cloud through their hashed and encrypted password with 
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Diffie-Hellman. This class maintains a table of users’ authentication signatures that it 
checks for authentication. When a mobile user wants to access the cloud host and 
deploying its VMs, he sends an encrypted signature. The mobile user control access 
decrypts it and tries authenticating with all of the authentication signatures list.   
VMM Protection: is used for managing the authorized VMs that hosted on the cloud’s 
servers. A green status gives the VM high permission to interact with other VMs or 
access secret data. If a VM exceeds the probability of unauthorized threshold, a denied 
access is reported and a VM is added to VMs Black List. 
VMs Communication Protection: is used to secure communication between two or 
more VMs intend to exchange sensitive data. Such class gets both VM’s identifiers 
and the session number to check the validity of VMs for allowing them to 
communicate with each other. If a VM fails to offer the right secure session key, the 
trust level will decrease and the target VM is added to the VMs Blacklist list. 
VMM Allocation Policy: after verifying the authentication of the user by the mobile 
user control access. The hypervisor allocates the available VM to the user’s application 
tasks. The host to be allocated by the secure cloud proxy is the one that considers 
among trust hosts list. Further, the secure cloud proxy deallocates the VM when the 
process is complete. From such class, we can obtain the host identifier that a given 
VM is executed. Also, the VMs belonging to a particular user. 
Secure Least VM Policy: is used to avoid the co-location attack issue. The VM is 
allocated to the host that has least VMs processing within it. However, a selected host 
will not be selected again for new VMs allocation. If all hosts are running VMs, the 
host that has more free processing unit will be selected to deploy the new VMs. In 
addition, hashed and encrypted Diffie-Hellman key must be used for legitimate VMs 
133 
 
to minimize unauthorized accessing on private data and managing the security 
allocation facilities. 
Secure Most VM Policy: is used to achieve low power consumption. The VM is 
allocated to the host that has the most VMs processing within it in order to reduce host 
power consumption. For new VMs allocation, the selected host will be selected again 
to deploy them. Further, hashed and encrypted Diffie-Hellman key must be used for 
legitimate VMs to minimize unauthorized accessing on private data and managing the 
security allocation facilities. 
Secure Random VM Policy: This class is used to randomly allocate the VMs to 
available hosts. However, a selected host will be either selected or not selected again 
for new VMs allocation. This random allocation strategy disturbs the attacker's goal 
strategy. Moreover, hashed and encrypted Diffie-Hellman key must be used for 
legitimate VMs to minimize unauthorized accessing on private data and managing the 
security allocation facilities. 
VMs Blacklist contains the list of unauthorized VMs that fails to provide the correct 
secure key and their probability threshold exceeds a certain unauthorized access value. 
Users Blacklist: This class contains the list of unauthorized mobile users.  
VMM key check: This class contains the session identifiers of all VMs hosted on the 
Cloud. Each VM executes in a particular session time. For each session, the secure 
proxy-based cloud manages specific VMs and its secret keys.  
Network Host: This class describes all servers located in datacenter in terms of 
hardware. It details the different information such as storage and memory size, the type 
of processing e.g. single or multi-core machine, etc. The different allocation policies 
for sharing the physical resources among VMs and distribution of user’s tasks. 
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5.3.2      Simulation Execution Workflow 
The proposed SecNetworkCloudSim provides means to ease the evaluation of security 
policies to derive performance insights over exchanged sensitive data between 
distributed VMs. The steps to successfully protecting the applications’ tasks on the 
cloud as well as their sensitive information through Proxy-3S are shown in Figure 5.4. 
After creating the network datacenter and configuring its multiple communication 
network switches across multiple hosts, the network datacenter broker is created in 
order to collect and submit VMs to the hosts. It also shows the number of cloud 
resources provisioned to a mobile application. The latter selects a suitable cloud host 
to meet the required application’s quality services. In this stage, the Proxy-3S is 
created in order to protect the application tasks and their sensitive information while 
deployed on VMs as well as manage the whole security aspects whether on the cloud 
side or mobile side. The developer creates VMs on two sides: mobile device and cloud. 
The latter can change the specification of the simulated cloud and mobile VMs 
according to a specific user’s requirements. The requirements depend on user specific-







Figure 5.4. SecNetworkCloudSim simulation execution workflow 
Once the simulation scenario starts to run on SecNetworkCloudSim simulator, the 
proxy-3S receives the new MAC address of mobile user’s devices hashed, encrypted 
with Diffie-Hellman and inserted into cloud service accounts.  The Proxy-3S sends the 
signature to the mobile user for access cloud service.  During the simulation phase, we 
have used the Poisson event-based simulation model to generate VMs legal and 
attackers, communications channels among all VMs whether VMs legal with VMs 
legal, VMs attacker with VMs attacker and VMs Legal with VMs attacker. While 
finishing the simulation process, the simulator provides its report and evaluates 
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security performances of the scenario such as efficiency and coverage of the 
application.  
5.4 Summary  
During this chapter, we presented SecNetworkCloudSim which is a NetworkCloudSim 
simulation tool extension.  Firstly, this new extension allows the integration of security 
policies as sub-level in each task which permits the modeling of VMs based intensive 
distributed applications. Secondly, ensures the secure access of users’ sensitive data 
shared between distributed VMs through the cloud. The chapter highlighted the main 
functional building modules of SecNetworkCloudSim and its software architecture. It 
provided design and implementation of the SecNetworkCloudSim through the class 
diagram and different involved classes to speed up the accurate simulation results 
across collaborating distributed tasks. The simulation execution workflow of 
SecNetworkCloudSim is already prepared to illustrate the main stages of security 
process once the distributed application executed on SecNetworkCloudSim.   
In the next chapter, we will present some experimental results and comparisons with 












PROXY-3S PERFORMANCE ANALYSES AND EVALUATION 
IN DISTRIBUTED MOBILE ENVIRONMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
Our challenge is to provide a system that secures distributed mobile applications by 
integrating policies and monitoring the access to sensitive data shared between 
collaborative tasks using Proxy-3S.   
In this chapter, we present the implementation and validation of the proposed 
approach’s performance compared to related works.  Section 6.2 gives the 
implementation and evaluation of Proxy-3S using real-world healthcare distributed 
intensive applications. Section 6.3 provides the different experimental configurations 
used to evaluate the efficiency and coverage of Proxy-3S. Section 6.4 examines the 
response time and security checking time of the proposed system. Finally, Section 6.5 
summaries the chapter. 
6.2 Implementation and Validation  
This section presents the validation of the proposed security approach in the context 
of distributed intensive tasks related to mobile applications, particularly in a health-
care. We have extended a popular cloud simulator: NetworkCloudSim [130] with new 
concepts that provide more protection of sensitive data shared among distributed VM-
based intensive tasks against different common attacks. The protection is done via 
enhanced security VM-based policies to achieve a high-security level on both cloud 
and mobile devices. The experiments were conducted by constructing healthcare 
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distributed applications to demonstrate the efficiency and the effectiveness of the 
presented approach.  
6.2.1 Prototype implementation 
SecNetworkCloudSim is implemented in Eclipse Java Development Tool (JDT) that 
extends NetworkCloudSim. NetworkCloudSim is a cloud simulator that simulates 
advanced application models such as message passing applications and network model 
for datacenters. The current available cloud simulators (e.g., NetworkCloudSim) have 
no supports both VM’s security and mobility features. These limitations may provide 
inaccurate results for sensitive distributed applications communicating tasks. Thus, we 
have extended NetworkCloudSim with Proxy-3S and its security policies, which 
allows the mobile users to grant access to the third-party intensive tasks of their 
applications in the cloud. It integrates Proxy-3S as a third party between the mobile 
users and their shared VM-based intensive tasks on the cloud. Its one of the main 
purposes is to ensure automatic application-user authentication for the deployed 
intensive tasks and to control the unauthorized access of users. Proxy-3S is located on 
the cloud side to manage the security and privacy of sensitive data and to enable secure 
communication among VM-based tasks applications. The extended 
NetworkCloudSim comprises up to three main modules, namely the Mobile client, the 
Proxy-3S and the cloud. The cloud is considered as a virtual network associated with 
the number of hosts that are located in datacenters. To accomplish such a system, three 
policies were developed within the Proxy-3S. The first one is the Mobile User Control 
Policy, which is intended for mobile users.  The second one is the hypervisor Policy 
for managing the secure allocation of VMs that embedded intensive tasks. The last one 
is the VMs communication protection policy for ensuring the robust data exchanges 
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among VMs while getting the authorization. In the mobile user control policy, a user 
provides the identifier and device MAC address. The following features may be 
performed on the deployed application: 
 Offering a high-security level on both cloud and remote sites tasks. 
 Providing an easy way to secure VM-based distributed applications in one-use-
password facilities.  
 Ensuring secure and legal private data exchanges between collaborative VMs. 
 Providing robust VM-based oriented tasks processes for multi-users. 
6.2.2 An Illustrative Case Study: Health Care System 
This section illustrates the increase of efficiency and coverage of the attackers through 
health-care case study while their thin VMs intend to retrieve the sensitive medical 
data from legal user VMs. The case study describes a distributed health mobile 
application that follow-up diabetes disease for patients. The security management of 
such applications and sensitive communications depends on distributed tasks in remote 
sites either in the mobile devices or in the cloud platforms. It defines three fundamental 
actors: users/patient, physicians: professional staff, and doctors. They are allowed to 
exchange and share sensitive medical data on the cloud. The application is built with 
two android-GUI presentation tasks. The first one is intended for patients and the 
second one for physicians. The application allows users/patients to send their heart 
information, which will be posted as message encrypted and signed using Hash-Diffie 
Hellman. Patients can include weight, temperature and blood pressure. It allows a 
doctor and a cardiologist in other sites to follow the updates of a user/patient. In order 
to provide such features, many intensive tasks are offloaded on VMs and always 
running on the cloud, e.g. temperature analysis task, blood analyses applied on 
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sensitive and private patient data. Figure 6.1 shows the application with several 
android-GUI tasks deployed on three mobile devices and six intensive-computation 
tasks intensive because the mobile device cannot support their execution due to its 
limited resources. In four different VMs on a different cloud server (e.g., Blood 
analyses task, temperature analysis task, weight analysis task and Diabetes Test task) 



































Figure 6.1. The architecture of distributed healthcare mobile application using Proxy-3S 
Only the authorized doctors/cardiologists must access the patient’s medical record. 
However, the access could not be reliable, hence we use Proxy-3S deployed in the 
cloud to control the unauthorized access of users and to control user’s VMs against 
malicious VMs. In this case, we seek to improve the security of the distributed mobile 
application and to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information outsourced in 
the cloud.  
We handled the case where a cardiologist successfully accessed the sensitive 
information of patients and there are no malicious attacks. The steps to successful 
outsourcing sensitive information as well as the communication process tasks through 
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Proxy-3S are shown in Figure 6.2. The steps followed in VM communication 
protection policy are almost the same used in the request of sensitive information (see 
Figure 6.3). It starts by checking the target VM which could be the valid VM’s 
identifier and password. Next, if the VM’s authentication is verified then the VM data 
access allows else the data access is denied. 
The Hash-Diffie Hellman secret key is used to encrypt/decrypt the message, it must be 
transparent to users. Next, the VMs communication protection policy monitors the 
security violations described in the previous section. So, it starts by checking off the 
accessed VM (e.g., diabetic test task). If the protection policy does not find any 
communication access violation, it authorizes the VM to share their sensitive data. The 
process ends when the system delivers the final results to the doctor. 
 
Figure 6.2. Actions performed and communication flow among actors and tasks 
The professional medical staff has many VMs communicates with VMs of a doctor in 
order to exchange patient’s data between each other. We suppose that VM attacker 
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inside cloud server 1 co-located with VMs of professional medical staff. This later 
intends to communicate with VM-legal of a doctor called Analyzer task. The 
successful communication of the VM attacker is considered as remote co-location with 
VM legal. This means, despite the VMs are located in the different hosts, but the 
success communication deems the VM attacker is beside the VM legal which make 
the possibility of retrieving its data. Proxy-3S increases the interaction of efficiency 
and the coverage attacker which consequently increases the efficiency and the 
coverage of the attacker (see Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3 Increase of efficiency and coverage communication of the attacker 
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6.3 Experimental evaluation 
In order to verify and evaluate the above Proxy-3S approach and its policies, various 
experimental evaluations were conducted in order to evaluate the ability of Proxy-3S 
to protect the user's sensitive data while handled in thin VMs from the attacker threats. 
6.3.1 Experimental configurations  
All our experiments have been performed on an Intel Core i3-5005U CPU 2.00 GHz, 
4 GB RAM, Laptop using Windows 8 (64 bit) system and Eclipse, an integrated 
development environment (Eclipse IDE). The proposed secure proxy starts running as 
a third party between the cloud and mobiles devices. Proxy-3S starts to encrypt all the 
mobile users address MAC and save the encrypted passwords in their own table. It 
checks the mobile users’ passwords and detects a number of attacks. Proxy-3S has a 
list of legal users and attacker users. For evaluation, we use five configurations: the 
first configuration consists of one datacenter with 150 servers. Each server has 2-Xen 
VMs with a total of 300VMs, 8 cores, and 2 GB RAM and 1T storage capacity. This 
configuration also consists of one edge switch 150 ports connected to the cloud hosts. 
The second configuration (configuration B) consists of one datacenter with 300 
servers, 1 Edge Switch, and 600 virtual machines. The third configuration 
(configuration C) consists of one datacenter with 450 serves, 1 Edge Switch, and 900 
VMs.  The fourth configuration consists of one datacenter with 600 serves, 1 Edge 
Switch, and 1200 VMs. Last configuration which considers a large scale of 1500 VMs, 
750 servers in one datacenter and 1 Edge Switch. 
All servers are connected with a bandwidth of 10 G bit/s. Each task of mobile 
healthcare application is executed on individual VMs for all configurations. Table 6.1 
shows the details of each system configuration. 
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Table 6.1  
Experimental configurations  
 










Configuration 1 150 1 300 8 1000000 10000 2048 
Configuration 2 300 1 600 8 1000000 10000 2048 
Configuration 3 450 1 900 8 1000000 10000 2048 
Configuration 4 600 1 1200 8 1000000 10000 2048 
Configuration 5 750 1 1500 8 1000000 10000 2048 
 
In the next sections, to verify the security and the execution time of proposed Proxy-
3S approach and Secure VMs allocation policy, we deployed a distributed mobile 
healthcare application in a simulated environment as well as we evaluated and 
compared Proxy-3S with secure VMs allocation policy [12, 83].   For an attacker, the 
goal is to maximize either their efficiency or coverage of their illegal VMs.  
6.3.2 Evaluating the efficiency of Proxy-3S  
We have evaluated and compared the efficiency of Proxy-3S with/without secure 
communication policy in five configurations as detailed in Table 6.1. The goal is to 
minimize both expired events ratio and missed situation ratio and to minimize the 
execution time. The high efficiency ratio shows the poor security of the approach. 
Table 6.2 shows the efficiency results and the execution time of Proxy-3S with/without 
secure communication performed on five cloud configurations. Proxy-3S with/without 
secure communication have different evaluation strategies concerning VM’s policies 
and VM’s attacks identification. The Proxy-3S approach without secure 
communication controls only the user access policy and allocates VMs in a same host 
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to check all co-located attacks. In contrast, the Proxy-3S with secure communication 
consider VMs exchanges as much as the number of user’s communication tasks that 
run simultaneously at the same time in different hosts. The more malicious VMs and 
remote co-located identifications attacks can be performed simultaneously. 
It is obvious that Proxy-3S with secure communication yields better efficiency on all 
configurations involved in the simulation. It is slightly higher than the efficiency 
results of Proxy-3S with secure communication. This caused by the absence of VM 
secure communication policy between communicating VMs deployed on different 
hosts. Thus, a system cannot detect malicious communications between VMs attacker 
and legal. However, the execution time of Proxy-3S without secure communication is 
slightly lower than the execution time of Proxy-3S with secure communication. The 
reason is that the VM security checking requires all the communications types and 
checking the security keys of all VMs deployed on different hosts in the cloud. Figure 
6.4 shows the evaluation of Proxy 3S efficiency with/without secure communication 























Evaluating the efficiency and execution time on different configurations using Proxy-3S 
 
Configurations 
Proxy-3S without secure 
communication 






Configuration 1 0.4729 41048 0.3560 44142 
Configuration 2 0.4966 77728 0.3930 78353 
Configuration 3 0.4800 113239 0.3754 118272 
Configuration 4 0.4648 364484 0.3650 367999 
Configuration 5 0.4624 463530 0.3698 467572 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Evaluation of efficiency on different configuration using Proxy-3S 
(with/without) secure communication 
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6.3.3 Evaluating the coverage of Proxy-3S  
We have evaluated and compared the performance of Proxy-3S with/without secure 
communication policy in terms of the coverage and execution time for five given 
configurations. The detail configuration parameters can be found in Table 6.1. Table 
6.3 shows the coverage and execution time using Proxy-3S of five configurations. 
Proxy-3S with secure communication archives the lowest values of coverage in all 
evaluated configurations. In all configurations, the Proxy-3S with secure 
communication can complete the security task in about 4.4 - 11.8 ms. Figure 6.5 shows 
the evaluation of Proxy-3S coverage with and without secure communication policy 
under different configuration  
Table 6.3 




Proxy-3S without secure 
communication 








Configuration 1 0.4605 41048 0.3798 44142 
Configuration 2 0.4900 77728 0.4188 78353 
Configuration 3 0.4800 113239 0.4147 118272 
Configuration 4 0.4617 364484 0.4000 367999 




Figure 6.5. Evaluation of Coverage on different configuration using Proxy-3S 
(with/without) secure communication. 
6.3.4 Efficiency and coverage comparison       
In order to validate the efficiency and coverage of the proposed approach, we compare 
the obtained results using Proxy-3S with similar works of [12, 83]. Table 6.4 shows 
the improved performance of efficiency of Proxy-3S under five configurations and 
various number of VMs with the approach described in [12, 83] and our proposed 
approach. Proxy-3S improves and provides lower efficiency compared to related 
works. The reasons are explicit consideration of the secure communications between 
VMs deployed on different servers in the proposed approach while the related work 
considers only the efficiency inside the same server cloud. We also consider in the 
proposed approach an attacker VM that may be act legal want to leverage the cloud 
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service. They can access to shared sensitive data shared among distributed VMs in as 
legal VMs.   
We assume that attackers can acts as legal users when they the cloud and allocates 
their VMs on the cloud’s servers. The VMs attackers co-locate with legal VMs in order 
to obtain sensitive information from them. When the attacker requests communication 
with other VMs located on the same or another server. Proxy-3S would detect a 
malicious behavior activity from the fake legal VM if he failed to give the right secret 
key. In this case, the legal VM is identified as an attacker, where the coverage and 
efficiency values will be different without the aspect of communications between 
VMs. Figure 6.6, Figure 6.7, Figure 6.8, Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10 show the efficiency 
comparison between our work and related works [12, 83] respectively under various 
configurations with a different number of VMs spreading (300, 600, 900,1200,1500). 
Table 6.4 
Efficiency comparisons on different configurations and VMs 
 
Number of VMs                             Configuration 1   Configuration 2    Configuration 3 
Secure Proxy-3S                                
50 - 350 – 650 0.3076 0.3627 0.3466 
100 - 400 – 700 0.2857 0.3621 0.3522 
150 - 450 – 750 0.3372 0.3523 0.3407 
200 - 500 – 800 0.3898 0.3624 0.3520 
250 - 550 – 850 0.3698 0.3646 0.3460 
300 - 600 – 900 0.3586 0.3573 0.3560 
Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
50 - 350 – 650 0.3333 0.4316 0.4189 
100 - 400 – 700 0.3658 0.4299 0.4181 
150 - 450 – 750 0.4166 0.4225 0.4111 
200 - 500 – 800 0.4653 0.4242 0.4212 
250 - 550 – 850 0.4218 0.4421 0.4223 




Number of VMs                                         Configuration 4                  Configuration 5          
Secure Proxy-3S                                 
950 - 1250  0.3618 0.3843 
1000 - 1300  0.3641 0.3753 
1050 - 1350  0.3647 0.3715 
1100 - 1400  0.3707 0.3714 
1150 - 1450  0.3704 0.3667 
1200 - 1500  0.4535 0.3600 
Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
950 - 1250  0.4324 0.4628 
1000 - 1300  0.4354 0.4534 
1050 - 1350  0.4376 0.4484 
1100 - 1400  0.4431 0.4474 
1150 - 1450  0.4439 0.4424 








Figure 6.7. Efficiency comparison in configuration 2 (600 VMs spread). 
 




Figure 6.9. Efficiency comparison in configuration 4 (1200 VMs spread). 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Efficiency comparison in configuration 5 (1500 VMs spread). 
153 
 
We have also implemented the coverage algorithm of the works [12, 83]. Table 6.5 
shows the coverage result comparisons on different configurations and VMs. As we 
can see, the coverage for the proposed method is considerably lower in all 
experimented configurations compared to related work [12, 83]. Although, Proxy-3S 
method using the secure VM communication policy, the coverage can reach 0.45 in 
different configurations compared to the work of [12, 83]. This shows that the 
proposed method allows low efficiency and coverage values in different configuration 
and VMs using Proxy-3S.  Figure 6.11, Figure 6.12, Figure 6.13, Figure 6.14, Figure 
6.15 show the coverage comparison between this work and similar work  [12, 83] 
respectively under various configuration with a different number of VMs spreading 
(300, 600, 900,1200,1500). 
Table 6.5 
Coverage comparisons on different configurations and VMs 
 
Number of VMs         Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3 
Secure Proxy- 3S  
50 - 350 – 650 0.2857 0.4285 0.4484 
100 - 400 – 700 0.2222 0.4190 0.4497 
150 - 450 – 750 0.3372 0.4304 0.4341 
200 - 500 – 800 0.4259 0.4307 0.4343 
250 - 550 -850 0.4090 0.4507 0.4253 
300 - 600 – 900 0.4150 0.4498 0.4456 
Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
50 - 350 – 650 0.3076 0.4730 0.5136 
100 - 400 – 700 0.2542 0.4611 0.5111 
150 - 450 – 750 0.3846 0.4786 0.4985 
200 - 500 – 800 0.4747 0.4745 0.4945 
250 - 550 -850 0.4426 0.5078 0.4910 





Number of VMs                                        Configuration 4                    Configuration 5          
Secure Proxy-3S                                
950 - 1250  0.4525 0.4571 
1000 - 1300  0.4503 0.4492 
1050 - 1350  0.4533 0.4476 
1100 - 1400  0.4515 0.4442 
1150 - 1450  0.4519 0.4342 
1200 - 1500  0.4535 0.4319 
Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
950 - 1250  0.5185 0.5160 
1000 - 1300  0.5152 0.5098 
1050 - 1350  0.5176 0.5094 
1100 - 1400  0.5107 0.5045 
1150 - 1450  0.5102 0.4927 
1200 - 1500  0.5106 0.4936 
 





Figure 6.12. Coverage comparison in configuration 2 (600 VMs spread). 
 




Figure 6.14. Coverage comparison in configuration 4 (1200 VMs spread). 
 
Figure 6.15. Coverage comparison in configuration 5 (1500 VMs spread). 
157 
 
6.4 Performances and Security Comparison Details  
In order to validate the efficiency and security of the proposed approach, we compare 
the obtained results using our approach with some similar related works and simulation 
tools available in the literature. 
6.4.1  Comparison of processing execution time 
We have evaluated the processing execution time with different cloud configurations 
after integrating security layers and compared to NetworkCloudSim.  As shown in 
Table 6.6, we observe that the processing execution time of the SecNetworkCloudSim 
tool is very satisfactory ranging from 44142ms to 467572ms compared to 
NetworkCloudSim in five different cloud configurations.   
Table 6.6 
Evaluating the execution time of SecNetworkCloudSim compared to 
NetworkCloudSim 
 
Configurations NetworkCloudSim (ms) SecNetworkCloudSim (ms) 
Configuration 1 42278 44142 
Configuration 2 76412 78353 
Configuration 3 117942 118272 
Configuration 4 157849 367999 
Configuration 5 186413 467572 
 
There is a slight difference in term of the processing execution time of both results. 
The difference of the results is due to the security layers integrated into 
SecNetworkCloudSim. The execution time of NetworkCloudSim refers to estimated 
simulation time of distributed application running on the cloud and the time spend in 
order to completely finish the process. Whereas, the SecNetworkCloudSim execution 
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time refers to the time spent by the distributed application in order to process including 
the checking time of the users control access, checking VM security keys, secure VMs 
allocation, and checking the VMs communications. However, SecNetworkCloudSim 
results showed a low-performance impact which does not irritate the users and does 
not affect the service level agreement between the user and the cloud provider. Figure 
6.16 shows the comparison results of the execution time of different tools. 
Figure 6.16 Evaluating the processing execution time of SecNetworkCloudSim 





6.4.2 Security comparison of mobile user access control mechanism  
Table 6.7 shows a comparison of the security mechanisms of mobile user access 
control and average security results between the proposed method and related works 
described in [12, 156] in terms of security checking time of public-private generation 
keys and encrypted mobile device’s MAC address verification.     
Table 6.7 
Features comparison between works in [12, 156] and the proposed Mobile User 
Access Control 
 
Approaches Data Security of 
Mobile User 
Average security checking 
time(ms) 
Co-residency [12] No - 
Hash RSA-1024 [156] Yes 257.2 
Proposed MUAC Yes 75.4 
 
The proposed mobile user access control is more effective and practicable than 
proposed related techniques. The reason is that our approach is trust-based VM-
communication model compared to work presented in [12] which is not considered.  
In addition, in the proposed mobile user access control, the mobile device’s MAC 
(password) and data request are encrypsted. This offers more security contrarily to 
work presented in [156] where the password is embedded without encryption. Finally, 
the checking security time required by the proposed method is on average, while it is 
high in works presented in [12, 156].  The checking security time refers to the time 




6.4.3 Comparison of the efficiency and coverage with details of VMs 
communication  
The efficiency and coverage ratios are important security factors in distributed VM-
based application, which reflects the ability of the system to check the security of a 
large number of VMs in a specific time. In order to evaluate the impact of different 
approaches on the efficiency and coverage ratios. We have implemented four 
scenarios-based VM-communication process model with different types of VM’s 
communications (5 – 100) to detect malicious communication or VM attacker: 
 VM legal communicates with VM legal 
 VM legal communicate with VM legal: One of the VM-legal is an attacker 
but behave like legal.  
  VM attacker with VM legal. 
 VM attacker with VM attacker. 
We distinguish between intra and inter-communication of VMs of the co-located and 
remote VMs respectively as illustrated in Figure 6.17. Our assumption claims that the 
security of communication among co-located and remote VMs implies that VM’s 
identify, VM’s location and the activity of VM should be consider into the design of 
VM-based distributed systems as follows: 
 Direct VM’s communication: either co-located or remote VMs (legal or attacker) 
able to communicate among each other in a specific shared time and space. The 
VMs are randomly selected.   
 Trust-based VM’s communication: consider only VMs to trust other VMs to 
perform communication tasks at a specific time. 
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 Group-based VM’s communication: communication by co-located VMs to 
achieve a common system’s task. 
 Federated VM’s communication: communication by co-located VMs of a given 
host in coherence with other co-located VMs of another host. 
 
Figure 6.17. Intra and inter-communication of VMs of the co-located and remote VMs 
The VM legal with the red font is a VM attacker but behaving as legal which is co-
located by another VM legal. Whereas, the red arrow refers to successful malicious 
communication between VM attacker and VM legal (i.e. unsuccessful malicious 
communication refers to a communication between VM attacker and another VM 
attacker). While, the green arrow refers to successful legal communication between 
VM legal and another VM legal (i.e. unsuccessful legal communication refers to a 
communication between VM legal and another VM legal, and the latter is an attacker 
behaving as legal VM). 
We have compared our proposed approach and the related work [12, 83] with different 
number of VMs either legal or attacker that increased gradually after each run (i.e. 50 
VMs either legal or attackers). Thus, we can simulate the scalability experiment for a 
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large number of VMs and the communication between them. With the direct mode of 
VMs communication, we create a specific number of VM communication (i.e. 5, 10, 
15, 20… 100) permits to simulate the VMs communication scenario where VMs need 
to perform a common task based on their communication probability. For example, 
VM 1 and VM 2 in different hosts with shared variable (perhaps shared memory and 
time). VM 1 updates shared variable by modifying the state of its task and VM 2 reads 
the shared variable.  
6.4.3.1 Comparison results for the smaller size configuration set VMs 
We have evaluated the efficiency and coverage with different number of VMs (50 – 
300) and a varied number of VMs communication (5 – 100). We use configurations as 
shown in Table 6.1. As shown in Table 6.8 we observed that the obtained results of 
the proposed approach are much better than related work of [12, 83]. In 300 VMs, the 
cloud system with our approach has better efficiency and coverage ratios. To clarify 
more, the number of attackers is equal to 165 and the legal is 135. Where 69 attackers 
success to co-locate with VMs legal. Once the detection of malicious VMs, malicious 
VMs communication is activated, the proxy detects 3 VMs attacker which was 
behaving as legal VMs. Moreover, the proxy detects 22 successful malicious 
communication that VMs attacker launched and succeed to communicate with legal 
VMs as well as 17 Unsuccessful malicious communication launched the VMs attacker 
fails to communicate with VMs legal. In another side, 22 legal communications have 
launched by a legal VMs whether successful or unsuccessful communication.  
After this updates that the proxy receives, the number of VMs attacker and the VMs 
legal are changed compared to their first values. Hence, the number of the VM attacker 
will be equal to the total of a number of new VMs attacker and total number of all type 
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of malicious communication (successful and unsuccessful) that launched by VMs 
attacker. Whereas, the VMs legal will be equal to the total of new VMs legal (minus 
the attacker VMs that behaving as legal) and total number of all type of legal 
communication that launched by Legal VMs. Therefore, in 300 VMs and after 
counting the new total number of VMs legal and VMs attacker, the proxy found 154 
VMs legal and 207 VMs attacker respectively. Thus, the proposed approach considers 
inter and intra-VMs communication in several experimented configurations. The 
similar work adopts only co-residency for identifying VM’s attacks.   
6.4.3.2 Comparison results for the moderate size configuration set VMs 
We evaluated the effectiveness of Proxy-3S with a moderate size of VMs ranged from 
350 to 600 in term of efficiency and coverage. Table 6.9 shows the obtained results for 
the moderate size configuration set VMs (600). In 600s VMs, coverage and efficiency 
of our approach are quite better than the related work [12, 83]. The number of VMs 
attacker detected by the proxy is equal to 340 and the number of VMs legal is 260. 
From 340 VMs attacker, 130 attacker VMs have successfully co-located with legal 
VMs which is approximately equal to 38% of the total number of VMs attackers. In 
addition, the proxy detects 23 fake VMs legal, 41 successful malicious 
communication, 96 unsuccessful malicious communication and 95 successful legal 
VMs communications. Once the full number of VMs legal and attacker that including 
the number of all communication types has been updated, the total number of VMs 
legal and its communication becomes equal to 294 and the total number of VMs 





6.4.3.3 Comparison results for the large size configuration set VMs 
In large-size VMs set configuration, we have also studied how the large number of 
users’ VMs affects efficiency and coverage ratios where the number of VMs grows 
from 650 to 900. We compare the proposed approach with similar related work [12, 
83]. In Table 6.10, we show the performance of experimented works in large size 
configuration set VMs. We can see that the efficiency and coverage ratios for the 
proxy-3S are considerably low in all experiments. However, under 900 VMs, the 
proxy-3S detects 143 VMs attacker co-located with legal VMs. It detects also 17 fake 
VMs legal, which considers as VMs attacker and were co-located by another VMs 
attacker. Indeed, the number of remote co-location is reduced by 17 co-locations to 
become 126 instead of 143, which is because that the integration of the communication 
policy module detects more malicious and legal communications. Proposed proxy-3S 
detects 53 successful remote co-located with target legal VMs and 22 unsuccessful 
remote co-located VMs among 261 established legal communications.  Once the full 
number of VMs legal and attacker that including the number of all communication 
types has been updated, the total number of VMs legal and its communication becomes 
equal to 875 and the total number of VMs attacker and its malicious communication 
becomes equal to 365. 
In summary, from the performance of low efficiency and coverage ratios, we believe 
this is good for large-scale VMs based distributed mobile application that needs to 
support runtime secure allocation strategy and communication security checking in the 
cloud environment.    
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Table 6.8  
































Proposed approach Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
Efficiency Coverage Efficiency Coverage 
50 24 26 10 9 1 2 0 2 25 29 0.3103 0.3600 0.3846 0.4166 
100 47 53 23 23 0 5 6 5 52 64 0.3593 0.4423 0.4339 0.4893 
150 73 77 31 29 2 10 10 10 81 99 0.2929 0.3580 0.4025 0.4246 
200 95 105 45 45 0 11 10 11 106 126 0.3571 0.4245 0.4285 0.4736 
250 114 136 54 53 1 17 11 17 130 165 0.3212 0.4076 0.3970 0.4736 
300 135 165 69 66 3 22 17 22 154 207 0.3188 0.4285 0.4181 0.5111 
 
Table 6.9 

































Proposed approach Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
Efficiency Coverage Efficiency Coverage 
350 220 130 88 77 10 15 13 20 230 168 0.4583 0.3347 0.6769 0.4000 
400 316 84 32 26 6 3 4 15 325 97 0.2680 0.0822 0.3809 0.1012 
450 339 111 44 31 13 22 48 80 406 204 0.1591 7.70. 0 0.3963 0.1297 
































































Proposed approach Secure VM allocation [12, 83] 
Efficiency Coverage Efficiency Coverage 










































































6.4.4 General drawbacks and comparison of security degree  
Table 6.11 presents the advantages and drawbacks between the proposed method and 
related works described in [12,  157]. As we can see from table 6.8, table 6.9 and table 
6.10 that the proposed technique is better than some recent methods available in the 
literature. The new security approach not only proves the effectiveness of the proposed 
method but also makes it practicable in spite of using different configurations 
applications.  
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With the appearance of new advanced technology, preserving the security of 
distributed mobile applications and their handled sensitive data becomes a 
fundamental and necessary. In this research, we have proposed a new Three Policies 
Secure Cloud Proxy (Proxy-3S) for preventing the intrusion of tenants’ sensitive 
information on the cloud environment exactly at the virtualization layer. This chapter 
presented an implementation and evaluation of our proposed approach compared to 
related works exist in the literature. Several experiments were conducted using real-
world healthcare applications. Experimental results have shown that the proposed 
approach provides lower efficiency and coverage in preserving data integrity and 
confidentiality. A comparison with some recent methods shows that the proposed three 
security policies within proxy is more efficient and decreases the coverage of the 













CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
7.1 Introduction   
This research developed a secure approach for ensuring the protection of sensitive data 
of the intensive distributed application that run on the mobile cloud computing 
environment. The approach is a software solution based on an intermediary proxy 
between the users that intend to leverage the cloud services and the cloud side 
environment. A conclusion for the research is presented in this chapter, where we 
review and summarize the main points including objectives, contributions and 
limitations of the work as well as several directions for future works.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 7.1 provides a concise 
introduction along with the organization of the chapter. The work carried out and the 
important points of the research are briefly highlighted in Section 7.2.  Section 7.3 
presents a summary of the research contributions. The limitations of this research are 
presented and discussed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 provides the future 
challenges that need to be tackled by researchers in order to further secure the user's 
data from VMs co-remote communication and VMs co-residents attack in a mobile 
cloud environment.   
7.2 Research Summary  
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have gained enormous popularity and 
interest in people's daily life. Many sophisticated mobile applications have spurred 
opportunities for increased efficiency and real innovation in several domains such as 
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medical, face recognition and mobile augmented reality. These applications require 
high computational resources to run intensive tasks. Due to computing and storage 
resources limitations, mobile devices migrate these applications to rich-resources on 
the cloud infrastructure. Thus, running mobile applications on the cloud servers 
address the mobile devices resources restrictions which produce the tremendous 
paradigm of Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC).  
The cloud enables on-demand access to a shared pool of virtualized computing 
resources that users can exploit for handling and deploying their mobile device 
applications [158].  Cloud computing allows users to leverage on virtualization 
technology in which server resources (hardware) are divided into multiple virtual 
machines (VMs) for mobile users as well as several executions being carried out at the 
same time. It permits offloading of all types of computational tasks on a VM (phone 
clone) system level. Each VM can execute some computational-intensive tasks on 
behalf of the mobile device and send the result back afterward [159].  
With the motive of securing virtual machines, the hypervisor is the software level that 
creates, runs and controls the virtual machines. This layer resides between the 
hardware and the users’ virtual machines. However, the researchers in [18] proved that 
a malicious user can circumvent the hypervisor and allocate their malicious VMs. 
Other issues that virtualization brings when applied to mobile cloud computing 
environment are unauthorized access of users to cloud services, VMs communication 
within a virtualized environment, which all make the risk of losing users data in Cloud 
side [3, 4]. 
The users’ VMs are isolated from each other even when they run on the same cloud 
physical machines in order to avoid sharing VMs’ sensitive data, which may risk 
exposing confidential data. Unfortunately, attackers are finding new ways to 
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circumvent weaker isolation of VMs, such as damaging the data confidentiality of a 
virtual machine and violating privacy through building attackers channels [13]. 
Researchers have shown that a malicious user can break the isolation by building many 
side channels between VMs for obtaining private data that process on legal users’ 
virtual machine. The malicious users deliver their VMs on the same server that hosts 
legitimate users virtual machines in order to co-locate with them and steal their 
information. 
Many security techniques and approaches were proposed [39, 117] to tackle security 
issues in virtualization. However, some solutions were based on changing or replacing 
the existing hardware of the cloud platforms. The solutions were not practical due to 
the high cost. In other solutions, some researchers [83, 30] focused on securing the 
VMs only in the same host (co-location issue) by introducing new secure VMs 
allocation policies [147]. However, none of the proposed solutions considered security 
issues of VMs communication in the cloud environment. Due to unsecured 
communication gateways, the sensitive data of distributed mobile applications face 
many threats from malicious behavior. Such behavior can affect the overall 
performance of the cloud service provider as well as lead to data alteration, revealing 
information, and deletion of information.  
In order to address the above challenges, this research proposed a software approach 
based on the secure proxy. It aims to enhance the protection of sensitive data integrity 
and confidentiality while the sensitive data is processed on the virtual machines in the 
cloud. It protects the sensitive data against three common attacks on virtualization 
layer such as co-resident attacks, hypervisor attacks, and distributed attacks. The main 
contributions of this research are:  
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 A novel Three Policies Secure Cloud Proxy (Proxy-3S) provides a highly 
secure way to help protecting distributed VMs from any emerging threats and 
decrease the probability of the insider and outsider threats and frauds. 
 To deal with the security of distributed tasks deployed on different hosts on 
the cloud, the Proxy-3S restricts access to the cloud only to the authorized 
applications by using key management encryption capabilities and secure 
management techniques of virtual machines. Therefore, unauthorized VMs 
cannot communicate with the legitimate VMs that contain sensitive tasks of 
the authorized applications. 
 To validate the efficiency and the coverage of the proposed security 
techniques, a real healthcare distributed mobile application is used in the 
experiment. The experimental results show that the proposed approach is 
superior to the current solution [12] and provides robust access and protects 
the privacy of data in the connected VMs. 
Despite the widespread release of several cloud simulators, controlling user’s access 
and protecting data exchanges in distributed mobile applications over the cloud is 
considered a major challenge. This research introduces a new NetworkCloudSim 
extension called SecNetworkCloudSim. It is a secure mobile simulation tool extended 
with a new layer called Proxy-3S to ensure secure access to sensitive data hosted on 
the mobile devices and distributed cloud’s servers. This tool enables users to specify 
their requests and allows them to connect through a proxy to perform secure cloud 
services access, deploys their tasks in the cloud using VM allocation policy, ensure the 
secure access of data shared between collaborative VMs through the Cloud and derive 
high efficiency and coverage rates. Most importantly, due to the secure aspects of 
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proxy, user’s distributed tasks can be performed without alterations on different 
underlying proxy’s security policies.  
The evaluation of SecNetworkCloudSim showed a low-performance impact compared 
to NetworkCloudSim, which does not irritate the users and does not negatively affect 
the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the user and the cloud provider. 
7.3 Research contribution  
The contribution presented in this research was mainly focusing on developing a new 
security approach based on software solution called Three policies Secure cloud Proxy 
(Proxy-3S) by taking into account the efficiency, coverage and execution time metrics. 
Our goal is to enhance the security measures of sensitive data by verifying the 
efficiency and coverage during the communication. The proposed solution cannot only 
protect the users’ sensitive data integrity and confidentiality that process inside VMs 
on the mobile cloud environment but also used to authenticate the transmitted sensitive 
data across unsecured attackers. 
a. The first axis concerned with proposing a new user control access policy for 
preventing the unauthorized access of mobile users that would leverage the cloud 
service provider and allocate their malicious virtual machines.  
 A new mathematical model for user authentication was proposed where 
malicious users can not violate and the damage sensitive data in distributed 
mobile applications. 
 The use of Hash-Diffie Hellman method for checking the validity check of 
the user and get robust user’s access control technique. 
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b. The second axis is interested in developing a secure virtual machine manager 
allocation policy for avoiding the deployment of malicious virtual machines on the 
cloud hosts.  
 A novel secure task deployment on the VMs strategy based secure key 
generation was proposed. This strategy presents a secure and robust virtual 
machine allocation method to provide a significant contribution in attacks 
authentication.  
 A new secure allocation of VMs using under the least, most and random 
policy was proposed. Indeed, attacks due to malicious VMs co-location with 
legitimate VMs is reduced using secure and safe hosts, which gives high 
efficiency. 
c. The third axis was interested in proposing new secure virtual machines 
communication policy for ensuring the secure exchanges of sensitive data among 
VMs deployed on different cloud’s hosts in the cloud environment. The principle 
of this policy is to perform the Hash-Diffie Hellman encryption/decryption process 
of exchanged sensitive information between VMs across the insecure public 
network by generating shared security keys, then checks the probability of 
unauthorized access of the VM to sensitive data. Finally, each remote co-location 
from the distributed communication between VMs is evaluated using new 
efficiency and coverage metrics. The experiments results showed better efficiency 
and coverage than the related work were achieved [12, 83].  
d. The fourth axis was interested in developing a secure mobile cloud environment 
called SecNetworkCloudSim, which is an extension of the popular used 
NetworkCloudSim for simulation of distributed mobile intensive applications. It 
based on three policies: user access control, secure virtual machine allocation and 
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secure communication between VMs. The environment exploits the well-known 
Poisson distribution law to generate VMs and adds support for modeling the VM-
based task execution and simulating the execution workflow. Moreover, this 
environment could detect if the VM sensitive data is violated or not and 
consequently deciding the VM authorization.   
In this research, the contributed approach has the below features. 
 Secures VM’s data against remote and co-resident attacks and reduces 
significantly the probability of unauthorized data exchange using new VM’s 
communication security policy 
 Improves security metrics (e.g. the efficiency and the coverage) by VM’s 
communication aspect and uses security metrics to evaluate security policies. 
 Conducts real-life experiments on the widely used simulation platform 
NetworkCloudSim and very cleverly through SecNetworkCloudSim to 
validate the approach.  
The main advantages of the proposed approach compared to existing related works are 
better efficiency and coverage in the cloud environment after considering the 
communication aspect, as well as, less execution time for the VM allocation process, 
without forgetting that the proposed security policies achieve more robustness. 
7.4 Research limitations  
Although this research has successfully designed, developed, tested and evaluated with 
several experiments that have shown promising results for high-level data protection 
and good efficiency rating compared with existing works. These experiments have not 
tested in real worlds cloud platform but only in a simulation environment. The 
simulation allows researchers to do repeatable experiments to get the highest accuracy 
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level of the performance demanded with lower cost overhead. However, the simulation 
does not provide optimal results like real testbeds, which give high results accuracy. 
The approach is focusing on securing the virtualized environment, exactly the users’ 
data that run inside thin VMs. However, the approach proposed has not taken into 
consideration the pre-offloading phase. To clarify more, the pre-offloading stage 
means that before the user offloads the intensive application from the mobile device 
to the cloud side. The attacker can sniff the data before the partitioning of the intensive 
application. Further, the attacker can deliver more VMs, whether on the mobile device 
or in the cloud. So, the checking security time can be slightly higher when verifying 
the eligibility of communicated VMs especially if they are allocated on the different 
locations where some VMs allocated in the mobile device and other VMs allocated in 
Cloud host. This limitation may violate the service level agreement and degrade the 
service quality provided for mobile cloud users.   
7.5 Future Works  
Beyond the solution based on security policies proposed in this research, several future 
directions still need to be carried out in order to protect the users’ data in a mobile 
cloud computing environment. The following are some challenges that can be 
addressed in the future to extend this work: 
Firstly, the approach needs to be tested and evaluated using real cloud systems 
(Amazon EC2, Google App Engine) and open source Hypervisors like Xen and KVM 
in order to evaluate the approach performance in preventing malicious users' access to 
the cloud, c-location and remote co-location (distributed attacks). As well, test the 
approach with real intensive and sensitive applications like banking application and 
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healthcare application which will be more effective and give real results about the 
performance of the approach.  
Secondly, reducing the security management checking time is considered as the main 
challenge that needs to be carried out in this proposed approach.  As mention as a 
limitation of this research, the approach proposed will make delay for controlling and 
verifying the whole VMs number on the cloud, which may cause a decrease of the 
cloud provider service quality and lose the trust of the cloud’s tenants. Thus, 
incorporating the optimization method will be an excellent future work to reduce the 
security checking time and make the approach more robust, flexible and adaptive for 
the current cloud systems. 
Thirdly, when Proxy 3-S allocates a VM in a specific host. This VM must run on that 
specific host in order to be controlled by the proxy. A malicious VM can change its 
location in the same host to co-locate in other placement. As a future enhancement for 
this approach, it is necessary to detect any Co-placement of VMs. The proxy will be 
able to detect the malicious placement of VMs from a specific host. Depend on the 
identifier of the VM and identifier of the host, the proxy detects that identifier VM is 
not assigned to a specific identifier host. 
Finally, chapter 5 presented our new secure simulator: SecNetworkCloudSim. This 
new simulator needs to be more tested and evaluated with different attack scenarios to 
evaluate the various parameters such as response time, time delay, packet rate and 
processing time. This simulator can analyze such attack of VMs communication and 
users access control, but still need more enhancement in order to make it able to 
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